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COMMENTS
LEGISLATIVE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST - AN ANALYSIS
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE
CODE OF ETHICS
"[T]he best security for the fidelity of mankind is to
make their interest coincide with their duty."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Governmental, and particularly legislative, conflicts of interest consti-
tute "an evil which endangers the very fabric of a democratic society."
'2 Citi-
zens are entitled to have absolute confidence in the integrity of their elected
representatives and public officialss and Americans have traditionally de-
manded the highest standards of their public servants in this respect.
4 In
order to assure that integrity and concomitant public confidence, situations
which create potential conflicts of interest, as well as actual misconduct,
must be avoided (1) to eliminate temptations that might affect performance
of official duties, 5 and (2) to prevent the appearance of impropriety.
6 At
the same time, however, there is a very real need for qualified public serv-
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 437 (Mentor ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
2. United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1960).
3. See, e.g., Legislative Code of Ethics § 2(1), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.2(1)
(1969).
4. What constitutes acceptable business practices often appears unethical in the
public mind when government officials are involved. See Eisenberg, Conflicts of
Interest Situations and Remedies, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 666, 669-70 (1959).
5. See, e.g., Buss, The Massachusetts Conflict-of-Interest Statute: An Analysis,
45 B.U.L. REV. 299, 301 (1965) ; Note, State Conflict of Interest Laws: A Panacea
for Better Government?, 16 DEPAUL L. REv. 453, 455 (1967). Since the primary
concern of conflicts of interest legislation is to prevent the potential for conflict
between the governmental employees' public and private interests, such legislation
is directed more at the "level of objective circumstances creating a risk of misconduct
rather than to the level of subjective misconduct." Buss, supra, at 301-02. As a
result, the scope of such legislation is often broader than might be necessary for
the prevention of actual abuses, and this breadth may discourage competent "innocent"
persons from public service. See note 7 infra.
6. The concern for public appearance is obvious from the various formulations
that have been advanced in an attempt to define a "conflict of interest." Perhaps
the best of these is that:
[W]henever the interest of the public official in the proper administration of
his office clashes, or appears to clash with the official's interest in his private
affairs, a conflict of interest arises.
Krasnow & Lankford, Congressional Conflicts of Interest: Who Watches the
Watchers?, 24 FED. B.J. 264, 266 (1964), quoting THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS 3
(1960). Of course, the subtleness and complexity of many conflict situations, the
so-called "gray" areas, render impossible any attempt at enunciating a precise,
comprehensive definition which is not so general as to be meaningless. For example,
there are always problems of defining "interests," public or private, and in determining
the precise point at which they become incompatible.
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ants, and any attempt to regulate governmental conflicts of interest must be
tailored so as not to deter qualified individuals from entering public service.7
The need to balance the promotion of public confidence and govern-
mental integrity against the facilitation of recruitment of competent public
servants is particularly acute with respect to state legislators. In most
states, the state legislator serves on a part-time basis for a salary which
alone is generally insufficient to support his family.8 That plus the legis-
lator's uncertain tenure almost requires him to have an alternative means
of support available. Accordingly, state legislators often have found it
necessary to secure employment and other sources of income outside of
government. Often these outside activities, such as private legal practice,
have a natural proclivity toward involvement with the state. Unfortunately,
a blanket proscription of such outside employment may exclude many
able citizens from government service, and create a "further narrowing of
the occupational classes from which legislators will be drawn." 9
In addition, there is a fundamental policy question concerning the
extent of the "disinterest" which may properly be demanded of the
framers of government. While most modern commentators have sup-
ported increasing the professionalism of state legislators, Lord Bryce once
commended America for the number of essentially private individuals in
its government, something he considered far superior to government by
"mere professionals."'1
Besides restricting the recruitment of able public servants, conflict
of interest legislation may have a dysfunctional effect on the legislative
process as a whole. It contradicts the rationale of representative govern-
ment to attempt to divorce public officials from the pressure and influence
of their constituents. Furthermore, in an era of ever-increasing govern-
mental regulation of the private sector, it is, perhaps, unrealistic and
7. It is widely acknowledged that, in drafting conflicts legislation, a balance
must be struck between the dual objectives of promoting actual and apparent
governmental integrity and of facilitating the recruitment of public officials and
employees. See, e.g., Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 1113 (1963) ; Comment, State Legislative Conflicts of Interest: An Analysis
of the Alabama Ethics Commission Recommendation, 23 ALA. L. REV. 369 (1971) ;
Note, State Conflict of Interest Laws: A Panacea for Better Government?, 16
DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (1967) ; Note, Conflicts of Interest of State Legislators, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1209 (1963) ; Note, Conflicts of Interest of State and Local Legislators,
55 IowA L. REV. 450 (1969); Note, Conflicts of Interest: A New Approach, 18
U. FLA. L. REV. 675 (1966). One commentator has noted that "it can be said almost
as a truism, that conflict-of-interest legislation is successful to the extent that it
prohibits dangerous conflicts without discouraging public service." Buss, supra note 5,
at 302.
8. See, e.g., Note, Conflicts of Interest of State and Local Legislators, 55
IOWA L. REV. 450 (1969).
In Pennsylvania the problem of minimal legislative compensation is not as
severe as in many states. The Pennsylvania legislator receives $15,600 per year plus
expenses and retirement benefits. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 5 (Supp. 1973).
9. Note, Conflicts of Interest of State Legislators, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1209, 1210
(1963).
10. 2 J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 69 (3d ed. 1901). A more
recent analysis has also led to the conclusion that "[o]ften times the outside
private interest proves 'useful in both providing information and perspective to
the problems of legislating and administering.'" Note, supra note 5, at 454.
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unwise not to expect and to allow private interests to participate in the
lawmaking process." Indeed, the right of citizens to petition their govern-
ment is fundamental and guaranteed by the first amendment.1 2
Just as that right of access to the legislative process is central to
effective representative government, so too is what has been termed the
constituency service role of the legislator."8 In the American scheme of
government, a citizen's best recourse, when dealing with government, is
his elected representative who will, by virtue of his elected status, be
most responsive to his demands. Thus, "historically a legitimate function
of the legislator has been assistance to his constituents in their dealings
with state governments.
1 4
With the difference between expected legislative behavior and criminal
activity being generally a matter of degree, attempts to assure legislative
right conduct through common law sanctions and general criminal statutes
have met with meager success. Those approaches stiffer from sporadic
enforcement and provide only vague, general standards affording the
legislator little or no guidance. 15 Accordingly, the current trend is to
handle the problem through separate legislative enactments which deal
directly with the problem of legislative conflicts and contain either criminal
prohibitions, general standards of conduct, or both.16 Consistent with this
trend, the Pennsylvania general assembly, in 1968, enacted the Legislative
Code of Ethics (the Code)17 for the express purpose of protecting public
11. Why the Corporate Lobbyist is Necessary, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 18, 1972,
at 62.
12. This proposition assumes, of course, that the first amendment "right of
the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances . . ." includes
the right to petition an individual legislator as well as the legislative body. U.S.
CONST. amend. I. While there is little authority on this possible distinction, the
understanding upon which lobbying tactics have become universally accepted in the
federal and state legislatures has been that individuals do enjoy a right of access
to the individual legislators that represent them. See generally, A. HOLTZMAN,
INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYING (1966). While the stringent regulation of legislative
behavior in the interest of promoting greater integrity in office would not necessarily
restrict a citizen's right to petition, such a right, if recognized, might act to preclude
an attempt to solve the problem by simply restricting contacts between individual
legislators and private citizens.
13. C. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN: HIS WORK As HE SEES IT (Anchor ed.
1964).
14. Note, supra note 9, at 1228.
15. See Note, supra note 9, at 1211-21 ; Note, supra note 8, at 451-55.
16. Among the states with recent legislation on the problem of governmental
conflicts of interest generally, or legislative conflicts in particular, are Arizona, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1291 to -1297 (Supp. 1972), Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 112.311 to .319 (Supp. 1972), Illinois, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 127, §§ 601-101 to -101
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972), Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75.4301-.4307 (Supp.
1972), Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:1141-1148 (Supp. 1972), Massa-
chusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A (Supp. 1972), New Jersey, N.J. REV.
STAT. §§ 52:13D-1 to 52:13D-11 (1970), New York, N.Y. PuB. OFFICERS LAW
§§ 73, 74 (McKinney Supp. 1972), Texas, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9
(Supp. 1972), and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.22.010-.120 (Supp.
1971).
17. Legislative Code of Ethics §§ 1-8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 143.1-8 (1969).
The complete text of the Legislative Code of Ethics is set forth in an appendix to
this Comment.
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confidence, providing legislators with guidance in gray areas, and curbing
tendencies for exploitation of legislative office.' 8
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the Pennsylvania Code
in order to ascertain its probable effectiveness in dealing with the problem
of legislative conflicts of interest. Initially, the basic outline and nature
of the Code will be discussed, followed by an analysis of its substantive,
remedial, and enforcement provisions. An attempt will be made to indicate
the probable meaning and scope of the Code provisions, bearing in mind
the objectives discussed above, as must be done in any attempt to inter-
pret or construe conflicts legislation. 19 Finally, the provisions of the Code
will be compared to the conflicts legislation of other states, and proposals
for more effective regulation in Pennsylvania will be submitted where
appropriate.
Analysis of the substantive provisions of the Code has been structured
to facilitate examination of the manner in which the statute deals with the
basic conflicts situations. Accordingly, that section of the Comment has
been subdivided by conflict situation, not by Code provision, and the
sections of the Code which touch upon each conflict situation have been
examined together. Due to the obvious overlapping of several of the
Code provisions, it has been necessary to discuss them in more than one
subdivision.
II. OUTLINE AND NATURE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE
CODE OF ETHICS
Pennsylvania has attacked the problem of legislative conflicts of
interest directly - the Legislative Code of Ethics is a separate act which
applies solely to state legislators. 20 As a "communication of warnings and
expectations," 21 stipulating proper official conduct, and including criminal
18. Legislative Code of Ethics § 2(4), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.2(4) (1969).
19. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 5, at 375.
20. Actually, the Code's coverage is broader than simply legislators for it applies
to "members" which "shall include a Senator, Representative, officer or employee of
the General Assembly or any committee thereof; but not a person employed on a
contractual basis or without compensation for a particular project." Legislative
Code of Ethics § 3(6), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(6) (1969). Although the
fact that employees and officials of the legislature, other than the legislators them-
selves, are not elected representatives insulates them from many of the special con-
flicts problems concerning legislators, such employees' interests and duties are
closer to those of the legislative than other branches of government, thus justifying
their inclusion within the separate legislative code. Throughout this Comment the
terms "member" and "legislator" will be used interchangeably unless the context
indicates otherwise.
Also, some differentiation between "special employees" and "full-time"
officials and employees has been deemed rational and necessary, at least on the
federal level. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1163. However, it is arguable that employees
on a contractual basis or without compensation should not be totally excluded from
conflicts regulations because of the very real temptation or opportunities for abuse
which exist for them. See Holifield, Conflicts of Interest in Government - Con-
tractor Relationships, 24 FED. B.J. 297 (1964). While Pennsylvania excludes such
employees from all the restrictions of the Code, other statutes restrain the activities
of special employees, though not as much as those of full-time officials. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (1970) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 4 (1970)
21. Note, supra note 5, at 462.
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prohibitions, the Code is clearly a step forward from the sporadic and
inconsistent application of common law sanctions to the problem.
The Code is a relatively short statute containing only eight sections,
the first three of which provide the short title of the act,22 legislative
findings and a declaration of policy, 23 and definitions. 24 Section 4 of
the Code 25 is captioned "Standards of Conduct" which, although expressed
as prohibitions, are merely broad statements of principle. The standards
are hardly extensive and are somewhat repetitive of other provisions of the
Code. Section 4(1) prohibits a legislator from accepting outside employ-
ment which will require him to disclose confidential information, 2  while
section 4(2) mandates that the member shall refrain from disclosing such
information and from using it to further his personal interests.2 T The
latter provision substantially duplicates the criminal prohibitions contained
in section 5(f) and (g)*28 Section 4(3) merely forbids the use of official
position for the securing of unwarranted privileges or exemptions. 29 This
standard is so broad that it encompasses all, or almost all, of the major
conflict of interest situations.
In contrast to section 4, section 5 of the Code ° contains prohibitions
which specifically define and forbid certain activity or conduct and which
are enforceable by means of criminal sanctions under section 6.31 Section
5(a) prohibits the knowing receipt of any gift or compensation, except
from the state, which is intended to or which would influence the member's
performance of his official duties, and also forbids compensated lobbying
and voting.32 Although the provision alone is quite broad, its scope is
limited by several of the exceptions contained in section 5(e). Section
5(b) attacks part of the confidential information problem by prohibiting
the receipt of compensation for consultation with respect to general assembly
matters, or which draws upon confidential information. 33 This prohibition
is partially duplicative of the more general prohibitions of sections 5(f)
and (g) against the use and disclosure of confidential information which,
unlike section 5(b), are unaffected by the section 5(e) exceptions. The
problem of self-dealing by a legislator is governed by section 5(c) which
22. Legislative Code of Ethics § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.1 (1969). The
complete text of the Legislative Code of Ethics is set forth in an appendix to
this Comment.
23. Legislative Code of Ethics § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.2 (1969).
Since this preamble contains a statement of the legislative purpose in enacting the
Code, it is of prime importance in interpreting and construing the statute.
24. Legislative Code of Ethics § 3, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3 (1969).
The definitions contained in section 3 of the Code will not be examined separately
but will be referred to during the discussion of the substantive and remedial pro-
visions of the act.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.4 (1969).
26. Id. § 143.4(1).
27. Id. § 143.4(2).
28. Id. §§ 143.5(f), (g).
29. Id. § 143.4(3).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5 (1969).
31. Id. § 143.6.
32. Id. § 143.5(a).
33. Id. § 143.5(b).
[VOL. 19
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restricts the member's freedom to participate in any state transaction in
which he is substantially, personally, and economically interested. 34 Section
5(d) requires that the legislator file an information disclosure statement
as a condition to his rendering assistance to outsiders in state transactions
for profit.35 This provision constitutes the sole disclosure requirement of
the Code, and is the only section directly applicable to the outside assistance
situation. The final two criminal prohibitions of section 5, sections 5(f)
and (g), forbid, as was mentioned above, the use and disclosure of con-
fidential information by the member.36 They are the fourth and fifth pro-
visions of the Code aimed at the confidential information situation. Notably
absent from the Code are express restrictions on extra-legislative employ-
ment, the activity of former legislators, and, most importantly, private
interest in a state contract.
An examination of these substantive provisions in the abstract reveals
that while they overlap in parts, the focus of each provision is quite
different. Section 5(c) proscribes those transactions in which the legis-
lator has a personal economic interest and attempts to act as a principal
in an official capacity, with participation as an official being the gist of
the offense. 37 The prohibition would apply to a member acting in his
private capacity or for a private party only when he is also participating
as a public official.38 Section 5(a) also touches upon the legislator's
performance of his official duties in that it prohibits the receipt of gifts
and compensation which would influence such performance or which are
given in exchange for his lobbying or voting efforts. However, involve-
ment as a government official is an element of the offense only in the
compensated voting situation and not generally, as under section 5(c). 39
Sections 5(b), (d), (f) and (g), on the other hand, do not require any
official activity by the member, although sections 5(b), (f) and (g)
concern the legislator's official conduct in the sense that the information,
the use, disclosure, or consultation with respect to which is proscribed
by those sections, is that which is obtained by the member as a result of
his official position.40 These prohibitions are aimed solely at the member's
private activity and forbid such activity when it is either for his own
benefit, in the case of section 5(f), 41 or for the benefit of himself and
other private parties, in the case of sections 5(b), (d), and (g). Even
with respect to the latter three provisions there is a large difference in
scope. Under 5(g) the prohibited conduct is merely disclosure of certain
34. Id. § 143.5(c).
35. Id. § 143.5(d).
36. Id. §§ 143.5(f), (g).
37. "Participate," as defined by the Code, "means to take part in State action
or a proceeding personally as a Commonwealth official." Legislative Code of Ethics
§ 3(8), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(8) (1969).
38. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(c), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(c) (1969).
39. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 14 3.5(a) (1969).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 143.5(b), (f), (g) (1969).
41. Id. § 143.5(f).
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information to outside parties 42 while sections 5(b) and (d) require
some active aid to outsiders. Moreover, as between sections 5(b) and
5(d), the form of aid prohibited differs in that the former forbids mere
consultation where certain governmental information is involved, regard-
less of whether the state is otherwise affected, 43 while the latter applies
to a member who actually assists a private party, but only with respect
to a state transaction. 44 Finally, sections 5(a), (b), and (d) require,
as elements of the prohibitions, some form of transfer of value from a
private party to the legislator, although the form of transfer is not
exactly the same under each provision; the section 5(a) prohibition in-
volves the receipt of a gift or compensation, 45 section 5(b) compensation
or a "thing of economic value,"'46 and section 5(d) merely compensation.
47
In contrast, section 5(f) mandates that the member obtain some private
gain from his use of confidential information, and section 5(g) may have
the same requirement with respect to his disclosure of such information,
while section 5(c) provides only that the member have some substantial
personal economic interest in the transaction in which he participates.48
Section 5(e) exempts certain enumerated activities from the appli-
cable provisions of sections 5(a), (b), (c), and (d), 49 but not from the
provisions of sections 5(f) and (g). Among the exempted conduct is
the receipt of bona fide reimbursement for otherwise unpaid traveling and
subsistance expenses,50 acceptance of public service or civic organization
awards, 51 and campaign contributions.52 These three exceptions apply
primarily to section 5(a). Further, section 5 (e) (7) exempts from section
5(d)'s disclosure requirement a lawyer-legislator's compensated repre-
sentation of interests adverse to the state in certain specified proceedings.
53
Although the Code contains no direct prohibition of a member's interest
in a state contract, there are two exceptions directed specifically at that
situation: section 5(e) (4) permits a member to share in compensation
received from the state by a "person" pursuant to a contract with the
state which is let by competitive bidding,54 and section 5(e) (6) allows
42. Id. § 143.5(g).
43. Id. § 143.5(b).
44. Id. § 143.5(d).
45. Id. § 14 3.5(a). Compare Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(5), PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(5) (1969), which defines "gift," with Legislative Code of Ethics
§ 3(4), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §143.3(4) (1969), which defines "compensation."
46. Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(11), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(11)
(1969), defines "thing of economic value."
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(d) (1969).
48. Id. §§ 143.5(c), (f), (g).
49. Id. § 143.5(e).
50. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(e) (1), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (1)
(1969).
51. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(e) (3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (3)
(1969).
52. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(e) (5), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (5)
(1969).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (7) (1969).
54. Id. § 143.5(e) (4).
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the receipt of compensation where the member has a de minimis interest
in the recipient, the legislator is the exclusive supplier of property pur-
chased by the state, or the state has purchased newspaper advertising
required by law.5 5 Finally, section 5 (e) (2) purportedly exempts participa-
tion in religious, civic, or political party activities from the criminal
prohibitions of subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d). 56
Section 6 of the Code authorizes the imposition of the criminal
penalties of fine or imprisonment upon a member convicted of violating
any of the prohibitions contained in section 5.57 Moreover, section 7
provides that the civil remedies of rescission or cancellation,5 8 restitution,59
and dismissal of the violating member ° are available to the state as
supplemental sanctions for violations of section 5 and as the sole remedies
for violations of the standards of conduct in section 4.61
Despite the civil remedies of section 7, the Legislative Code of Ethics
is essentially a criminal statute, relying heavily upon specific prohibitions
with criminal sanctions. While criminal prohibitions are appropriate where
unethical conduct can be specifically and objectively defined, 62 and are
still extensively employed in several states,63 it must be recognized that
it is impossible to clearly define all of the conflicts situations which can
arise. Further, there is an apparent inability and unwillingness to enforce
such a criminal statute.
64
Accordingly, the better approach, and the trend among the states
which have faced the problem of legislative conflicts, is to limit the use
of criminal prohibitions to those situations in which the proscribed conduct
55. Id. § 143.5(e)(6).
56. Id. § 143.5(e)(2).
57. Id. § 143.6.
58. Legislative Code of Ethics § 7(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.7(a) (1969)
59. Legislative Code of Ethics § 7(c), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.7(c) (1969).
60. Legislative Code of Ethics § 7(e), PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.7(e) (1969).
The sanction of dismissal or suspension from employment applies only to employees
and officials of the general assembly other than legislators. However, pursuant to
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 121 (1963), a legislator, or any public official, convicted
in a court of record of a misdemeanor in office (violation of section 5 of the Code
is a misdemeanor under section 6) shall forfeit his office and the sentence imposed
upon him is to include a direction of removal from office. In addition, a finding that
a legislator had violated the Code would be grounds for impeachment under the
Pennsylvania state constitution. PA. CONST. art. 6, §§ 6-7.
61. Section 7 also provides the procedure to be followed in the use of the civil
remedies and contains a statute of limitations for an action seeking restitution.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.7 (1969).
The final section of the Code is a severability clause providing that the
holding of any section of the act invalid will not affect the validity of any other
section. Legislative Code of Ethics § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.8 (1969).
62. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 373; Note, Conflict of Interest of
State Legislators, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1209, 1225 (1963); Note, Conflicts of Interest
of State and Local Legislators, 55 IOWA L. REv. 450, 456-57 (1969).
63. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1297 (Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 268A, §§ 2-5 (Supp. 1970). The Arizona statute contains only
criminal sanctions, while the Massachusetts act does contain a code of ethics with
non-penal sanctions, although it is primarily a criminal statute.
64. See, e.g., Note, Conflicts of Interest: A New Approach, 18 U. FLA. L. REy.
675, 687-88 (1966). In this respect it is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania
Legislative Code has never been enforced by a court of record.
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is clearly definable and to rely more on "codes of ethics" 65 establishing
broad guidelines or acceptable standards.6" Such codes are desirable because
they provide general direction and advance warning to the legislators,
enable the state to achieve the objectives of the conflicts prohibition without
resorting to the courts and the criminal law in every instance, and increase
the scope of the conflicts acts without deterring governmental service.6 7
The Pennsylvania general assembly's attempt to provide such standards
of conduct in section 4 is weak at best due to the limited coverage of the
section and its partial repetition of section 5's prohibitions. It is submitted
that the general assembly should amend section 4, at least outlining the
basic principles and policy objectives which underlie the specific criminal
provisions of section 5.68
However, despite the fact that this aspect of the Code is somewhat
lacking in comparison to other states' conflicts legislation, the Pennsylvania
approach of regulating legislative conflicts directly through a separate
statute is superior to that of the majority of the other states, which include
legislators within general enactments governing all public officials and
employees.6 9 The Pennsylvania approach is more appropriate in this
respect because the singular concerns and problems of state legislators
render unsatisfactory any attempt to handle the legislature within the
same rules that govern the other branches of government. In addition to
the fact that state legislative service is generally part-time,70 the legislator's
role as the elected representative of his constituents distinguishes him from
executive and judicial employees. Separate legislation aimed exclusively
at legislative conflicts of interest permits the state to provide for these
65. A "code of ethics," as it is used here, may be defined as:
[A] statement of acceptable standards of behavior for government officials and
employees . . . . The code of ethics is a mode of communicating, in advance,
warnings and expectations to public officials, and at the same time informing the
public as to what is acceptable behavior . . . . It creates a sense of security for
the public and hopefully makes some legislators more aware of the guidelines.
Note, supra note 5, at 462.
66. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 671-72; Comment, .supra note 7, at 373;
Note, supra note 9, at 1230.
67. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 5, at 306-07; Comment, supra note 7, at 403;
Note, supra note 64, at 682.
68. One article discussing the recent federal conflict of interest statute, 18
U.S.C. §§ 201-09 (1970), contains a good statement of the principles underlying
conflicts legislation which the general assembly should incorporate into section 4
almost verbatim. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1118-22. Moreover, a proposed conflicts
statute, based on those of several states, includes a governmental code of ethics with
guidelines that are more specific than mere statements of principle, and which can be
used as a basis for drafting subsections of section 4 to supplement the broad state-
ment of principles. Note, supra note 64, at 690-93.
69. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.311-.319 (Supp. 1972) ; KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 75.4301-4306 (Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:1141-:1148 (Supp.
1972); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A (Supp. 1972); N.J. REV. STAT. §§
52:13D-12-27 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. PuB. OFFICERS LAW §§ 73, 74 (McKinney Supp.
1972); TEX. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 42.22.010-.120 (Supp. 1972). Among those few states which, like Pennsyl-
vania, have statutes governing state legislators separately are Arizona, ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1291 to 41-1297 (Supp. 1972) and California, CAL. GOV'T CODE,
§§ 8920-8926 (West Supp. 1972).
70. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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special problems and to guide the solon directly, without the need for
extensive and often confusing exemptions which have only added to the
complexity of general conflicts legislation.
71
Of course, the unification and consolidation of all a state's conflicts
laws is a legitimate objective.72 Nevertheless, the legislature can, and
should, be governed by separate provisions, as has been done in Virginia.
The Virginia Conflicts of Interests Act 73 is a general statute dealing with
all state and local government officers and employees; however, a special
section enumerates the standards of conduct applicable to legislators and
legislative candidates, creating, in effect a separate act within the act. It
is submitted that the Pennsylvania general assembly should give serious
consideration to the enactment of legislation in similar form.
7 4
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CODE
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
A. Self-Dealing
Self-dealing, or "the act of a public official, taken in his public capacity,
in dealing with himself in his private capacity," 75 has been justly labeled
the most obviously objectionable behavior of a public official.7 6 The evil
presented by such conduct is clear. When an official directly participates
in governmental activity in which he has a personal interest, the temp-
tation to act, and the risk that he will so act to promote his private in-
terest as against that of the public is great. The appearance presented
to the public by such self-dealing is that the official is using his government
position to advance his private interests or at least to directly influence
government action which affects such interests.7 7 However, the need for
71. See generally the statutes cited in note 69 supra.
72. Consolidation, unity, and consistency have been noted as being among the
chief accomplishments of the recently enacted federal conflicts of interest statute.
18 U.S.C. §§ 201-09 (1970). Perkins, supra note 7, at 1163. In fact, one of the
biggest problems with most state conflicts legislation, including that of Pennsylvania,
is that it is scattered throughout the statute books and is often inconsistent.
73. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-347 to -358 (1973).
74. In such an enactment, the various Pennsylvania conflicts prohibitions, at
least those applicable to state level employees, could be consolidated in one place
instead of being scattered throughout the state statutory codification as is presently
the case. Among the statutes which could be moved would be the State Adverse
Interest Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 776.1-.8 (1962), and the Lobbying Regis-
tration Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 148.1-.9 (1969).
75. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1118.
76. Id.
77. The danger created by legislative self-dealing is similar to that involved
in representing "outsiders" in dealing with the government. However, in the self-
dealing situation, the member's personal interests are directly involved while the
connection may be more indirect in the assistance situation. Moreover, while un-
compensated aid to or representation of constituents in dealings with the state has
been deemed a legitimate and permissible function of a state legislator, Comment,
supra note 7, at 387; Note, supra note 9, at 1228, the legislator's duties cannot
include direct service of his own interests. Self-dealing would appear to be the most
flagrant contravention of the policy of undivided loyalty to the state and the public.
Cf. Buss. sui'ra note 5, at 323; Comment, supra note 7, at 387-88; Note, supra note
64, at 684; Note, supra note 9, at 1227.
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the legislator to perform his representative function mitigates against abso-
lute prohibition of all forms of self-dealing, partly because a member's
personal interests will often coincide with those of his constituents so
that he may often be serving his own interests in promoting theirs. As a
representative of his community, the legislator is required to serve the
community's interest, and often is elected because his interests are the
same as those of his electors.
78
The principle underlying the prohibition of self-dealing, that "[p] ublic
officials must disqualify themselves from participating in government action
when a particular course of government action may significantly affect
their personal economic interests," 79 is effectively embodied in the pro-
hibition of section 5(c) of the Pennsylvania Code.80 That section pro-
hibits the legislator from participating as a principal in "any transaction
involving the Commonwealth or any Commonwealth agency" in which
the member, his immediate family (spouse and children), or any "person"'
with whom he holds a position of employment has a "substantial personal
economic interest.)
8 2
Section 5(c) operates to restrict the public or official conduct of the
member, for it prohibits his "participation," which the Code defines as
78. See Note, supra note 5, at 454. A general divestment of financial holdings
in the interest of precluding possible self-dealing would be an inordinately burden-
some remedy as applied to legislators since, logically, the divestment would have to
be almost total. "There are few areas which are not subject to government control
as benefited by governmental subsidy." Lee, Conflict of Interest: One Aspect of
Congress' Problem, 32 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 954, 969 (1964). See notes 7-10 and
accompanying text supra. When divestment is an impractical approach, disclosure
requirements become especially important. See notes 273-99 and accompanying
text infra.
79. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1118 (footnote omitted).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(c) (1969). The self-dealing restriction
would also come within the broad standard of conduct provision of section 4(3).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.4(3) (1969). The complete text of the Legislative
Code of Ethics is set forth in an appendix to this Comment.
At least part of the self-dealing problem is governed by the Pennsylvania
constitution which provides in pertinent part:
A member who has a personal or private interest in any measure or bill pro-
posed or pending before the General Assembly shall disclose the fact to the
House of which lie is a member, and shall not vote thereon.
PA. CONST. art. 3, § 13. This provision would foreclose only the most obvious
opportunities for self-dealing, but, unfortunately, it has never been enforced by a
court of record so that its impact upon the activity of members is questionable at
best. However, if article 3, section 13 is enforceable, it is submitted that the phrase
"personal or private interest" should be construed as not including an interest of the
member and his constitutents generally, in order that the legislator's performance of
his representative function is not unduly restricted. See Note, supra note 5, at 454.
See also text accompanying notes 91-92 infra.
Finally, section 5(a) of the Code touches upon the self-dealing situation, in
the sense that it prohibits the receipt of compensation by a member for lobbying
or voting for the passage or defeat of legislation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 14 3.5(a)
(1969). In such a situation, the member's public conduct would be his lobbying or
voting, while his private interest would be the compensation received. However,
section 5(a) is more directly aimed at the outside gift or compensation situation.
81. See Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(9), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(9)
(1969), for the definition of the term "person." "Person" will be placed in quotation
marks in this Comment whenever it is being used in the statutorily defined sense.
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(c) (1969).
[VOL. 19
11
Shellenberger and Hardt: Legislative Conflicts of Interest - An Analysis of the Pennsylvan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
NOVEMBER 1973]
taking any action as a state official. 83 The member may still acquire and
retain private interests in government transactions if he abstains from
participation. Moreover, the prohibition only applies to a member who
participates "as a principal," a phrase which, although not defined in the
Code, apparently means that the official action taken by the member
with respect to the transaction in question must be done personally as one
with controlling authority or as a chief. 84 Such a reading would con-
ceivably permit the legislator to vote on a bill in which he has a sub-
stantial personal economic interest. Further, under this interpretation,
the legislator might avoid the section 5(c) prohibition merely by delegat-
ing his authority with respect to the transaction to another. Indeed, the
phrase "as a principle," through any possible reading, can only serve to
qualify the basic prohibition against official participation which it modifies,
and should therefore be deleted.8 5
Under section 5(c), a member is prohibited from participating in
"any transaction involving the Commonwealth or any Commonwealth
agency." Such a transaction is defined quite broadly and would cover
almost every governmental activity in which the state has a significant
interest,O including the enactment of legislation.8 7  This would appear
appropriate because the evil at which self-dealing prohibitions are aimed
83. Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(8), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(8)
(1969).
84. Cf. id.; MERRIAM-WEBSTERS NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1802 (3d ed.
1971).
85. A limitation on the reach of the section 5(c) self-dealing prohibition througha narrow reading of the "as a principle" qualification is not justified by the need
to permit the legislator to perform his representative function. That factor isalready accounted for in section 5(c)'s definition of the disqualifying personal interest.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(c) (1969). See text accompanying notes 91-92 infra
and notes 105-06 and accompanying text infra.
86. "Transaction involving the Commonwealth" is defined in Legislative Code
of Ethics § 3(12), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(12) (1969). "'State action'
means any action on the part of the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth agency .... "Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(7), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(7) (1969).
For the Code definition of "agency," see Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(1), PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(1) (1969). Thus, the only governmental activity inwhich the member could lawfully participate despite his personal interest would be
a matter with respect to which he had no reason to believe the state would take
any action, or be a party, and in which the state interest was merely indirect or
remote.
The requirement that the member must believe or have reason to believe
that the State will be involved or directly interested in the matter protects the
"innocent" legislator who has no reason to suspect a conflict between his public
obligations and his private interests, thereby hopefully reducing the deterrent effect
of the prohibition on potential public servants. However, even self-dealing by an
innocent" legislator may present the appearance of unethical behavior and the
requirement might be subject to abuse by officials who falsely protest their innocence.
Accordingly, a viable ethics committee is necessary to closely scrutinize any claims
of lack of belief. See notes 300-19 and accompanying text infra.
87. Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(7), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(7)
(1969). Of course, the requirement of disqualification from participation in legislative
matters duplicates, in part, article 3, section 13 of the Pennsylvania constitution.
However, the constitutional provision applies only to bills or measures before the
general assembly and requires disclosure as well as abstention, while section 5(c)
of the Code covers any matter before the legislature or a committee thereof and
demands only abstention. PA. CONST. art. 3, 13. See note 80 supra.
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is much greater than mere voting on legislation in which the legislator
has an interest.
In order for the legislator to be required to abstain from participation
in a governmental transaction, his interest, or that of his family or private
employer, must be a "substantial personal economic" one.8 8 "Personal"
is adequately defined in section 5(c) as being an interest other than "that
of a general class or general group of persons of which he may reason-
ably be expected to know," 89 thereby protecting the right and duty of
the legislator to participate in governmental activities when the interests
of his constituents or a group thereof are involved.9 ° Further, the re-
quirement that the personal interest be substantial excludes, as it should,
those interests which are insignificant or remote.91 Any attempt to further
define the extent of the disqualifying interest would render the prohibition
overly rigid, and further guidance can be provided more effectively on an
ad hoc basis. Although non-economic interests may tend to influence the
legislator's performance of his public duty, 92 section 5(c)'s limitation to
economic interests is justified by both the difficulty of determining what
is a substantial personal non-pecuniary interest and the need to accom-
modate the member's representative function. A restriction based upon
such an interest would be more appropriately handled by a general code
of ethics without the need to resort to the criminal law for enforcement. 93
Finally, it should be noted that the disqualifying interest is not only
that of the legislator but also that of his immediate family and "any
person of which he is an officer, director, trustee, partner or employee." 94
This is justified because the temptation for, and public appearance of,
unethical behavior is as great where such other persons are interested
as it is where the legislator himself is interested, due to his close con-
nection with them and his opportunity for personal benefit if they are
favored by governmental action. Although the legislator may have a
close relative not within his immediate family whose interest might create
similar dangers, the line must be drawn somewhere.
88. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(c), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(c)
(1969).
89. Id.
90. See note 77 supra.
91. This exclusion is also justified by the need to balance the objective of
promoting actual and apparent integrity in government against the need for recruit-
ment of able public servants. See notes 5-7 and accompanying text supra.
92. Buss, supra note 5, at 355.
93. Although the Code requires that the member believe or have reason to believe
that the state will be involved or directly interested in the matter in question, see
note 86 supra, it does not provide that the legislator must have any knowledge or
reason to know of his private interest. While this prerequisite might seem unnecessary
because the legislator will probably know his and his family's interests, the
knowledge requirement is contained in the Massachusetts and federal statutes and
has been commended on the ground that it sanctions the use of blind trusts for
officials' investments. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1134. See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1970)
MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 268A, § 6 (1970).
94. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(c), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 14 3.5(c) (1969).
[VOL. 19
13
Shellenberger and Hardt: Legislative Conflicts of Interest - An Analysis of the Pennsylvan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
NOVEMBER 1973]
The only exception contained in section 5(e) which might relieve a
legislator from the restrictions of section 5(c) is section 5(e) (2) 91 which
exempts participation in the affairs of religious, civic, or similar organi-
zations or in the activities of a political party. However, even assuming
that "participation" as used in section 5(e) (2) means the taking of action
as a government official,9 6 it would seem that the situations which this
section would exempt from section 5(c)'s prohibition would be few, for
unless the affairs or activities participated in also constituted "transactions
involving the Commonwealth" and the participating member was per-
sonally, substantially, and economically interested therein, participation
would not be prohibited in the first place.
With respect to the self-dealing situation, the Code goes beyond the
conflicts legislation of most other states, and those states would do well
to follow Pennsylvania's lead. While the codes of ethics of several states
contain provisions similar to section 4(3) of the Pennsylvania Code,
97
and some statutes restrict the legislator's right to vote on legislation in
which he has a personal interest,98 only Louisiana99 and Massachusetts'"0
have statutory prohibitions similar to section 5(c) of the Pennsylvania
Code.10 1 However, the Massachusetts act is weakened by the apparent
exclusion of general legislation as a matter with respect to which the
interested legislator may not participate.
10 2
Texas' recently revised and expanded code of ethics now includes
a strong prohibition against a legislator "having] any interest, financial
or otherwise ...in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (2) (1969).
96. Section 5(c) speaks in terms of "participate," and the definition contained
in section 3(8) is of that term, while section 5(e) (2) covers "participation." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 143.3(8), 5(c), 5(3)(2) (1969). It would seem reasonable
to interpret both terms as having the same or similar meaning, but the Code does
not clearly answer the question.
97. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(3) (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 268A, § 23(d) (1970) ; N.Y. Pun. OFFICERS LAW § 74(3) (d) (McKinney Supp.
1972) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.22.040(7) (1972).
98. Texas prohibits the legislator from voting on a bill in which he has a
personal interest and also requires disclosure of that interest. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-9, § 4(f) (Supp. 1972). Texas also prohibits a member from intro-
ducing a bill which would directly and particularly affect a client or employer of that
member. Id. art. 6252-9, § 4(m).
The California code prohibits participation in the passage or defeat of any
legislation in which the member has a personal interest. However, the legislator
easily can exempt himself from the disqualification mandate by filing a statement in
the legislature journal disclosing his interest and swearing that he can vote fairly
and objectively notwithstanding the interest. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8920(a)(5)(i)
(West Supp. 1973).
99. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1143(c) (1965).
100. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 6 (1970).
101. The Illinois act is interesting because it gives the legislator the option
of divesting himself of his personal interest, abstaining from participation in the
official activity, or neither, and lists several factors which the member should
consider in making his choice. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 603-202 (Smith-Hurd
1967). Such a provision is no prohibition but merely a guide since it leaves the
decision up to the conscience and integrity of the legislator. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127,
§ 603-206 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
102. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § l(k) (1970).
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duties in the public interest."'10 3 While the Texas statute facially appears
to be an effective proscription, it is submitted that the Pennsylvania
approach of simply prohibiting public participation where personal in-
terests are involved, rather than the personal interest itself, is superior as
it has a less disruptive effect on the private interest of the legislator,
while adequately protecting the public by restricting the legislator's par-
ticipation in a matter in which he has a private interest. The Texas
approach could feasibly force a legislator to dissolve an important per-
sonal interest that might create a conflict situation only once. Such overly
stringent standards always bear the practical risk of being considered
unenforceable, and thus being ignored.
0 4
Despite the general superiority of the Pennsylvania self-dealing
provision, at least two modifications of section 5(c), suggested by other
states' conflicts legislation, would strengthen the Code. First, it is sub-
mitted that the general assembly should amend the section to prohibit
"personal and substantial" participation instead of the present overly nar-
row element of participation "as a principle." The suggested phraseology
is used in several sections of the federal conflicts of interest statute'0 5 and
its inclusion in section 5(c) would not only broaden the prohibition, but
would also enable the Pennsylvania courts enforcing the section to draw
upon the federal courts' construction of the same language. 1 6
A second modification of section 5(c) would be to prohibit partici-
pation not only when the member presently holds a position with an in-
terested "person" but also when the member is negotiating or has some
arrangement for prospective employment with the "person," as is done
by the federal act 107 and the Massachusetts statute. 10 8 Although the
absence of such a provision permits evasion of section 5(c)'s restriction
by postponing acceptance of employment until after participation in the
governmental transaction, it may have been omitted because of fears that
103. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9, § 4(d) (Supp. 1972).
104. The Texas approach of disallowing the interest is, of course, that used by
many states in dealing with the public contracts problem. The approach is more
appropriate in that context, since the great opportunity for maximizing private interests
in allocating public monies necessitates a strict sanction, and because a form of action -
the making of the contract with a public agency - is the proscribed conduct - not
the private interest itself, which may remain provided business is not done with the
state. See notes 137-42 and accompanying text infra.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1971). It has been stated:
The language [of the federal act] is designed to connote the degree of relation-
ship between a government official and a particular governmental proceeding
which will bring to bear the prohibitions of those sections . . . . The qualifying
adverbs "personally and substantially" are intended to "rule out participation
by purely ministerial or procedural acts, but not to create a loophole for the
lazy executive in the chain of command who may have not bothered to dig into
the substance of the case."
Perkins, supra note 7, at 1128, quoting BAR Ass'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 274
(footnote omitted).
106. While the federal act is not applicable to congressmen, this does not necessarily
mean that the "personal and substantial" language would be inappropriate for
legislators.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1970).
108. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268A, § 6(a) (1970).
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a prospective employment clause would have an unnecessary deterrent
effect on legislative service due to the part-time legislator's need to arrange
for private employment both during and after his term. However, it is
submitted that when either a present arrangement or negotiation for
future remuneration exists, the danger of self-interest coloring a legis-
lator's judgment is great enough to justify the prohibition.
B. Personal Interest in State Contracts
The danger involved in the situation in which state contracts are
made with either a state legislator or an entity in which the legislator
has a financial interest, is that the agency letting the contract may be
susceptible to influence. While the relationship between the legislature
and the agency may give the legislator or entity a competitive advantage
over other potential contractors, 10 9 of even greater importance is the fact
that a state contract in which a legislator has a personal financial interest
gives the appearance of favoritism and influence peddling. Thus, it can
be stated as a broad principle that no state legislator should have any
personal interest in any state contract. 110
Although Pennsylvania has various statutory provisions which forbid
state executive officials and employees from having a personal interest
in state contracts,"' there is no express prohibition in the Legislative Code
of Ethics specifically directed at legislator's private interests in state con-
109. Cf. Comment, supra note 7, at 383-84. State agencies are dependent upon the
legislature for such things as appropriations and the confirmation of appointments.
The legislature also controls the scope of an agency's jurisdiction and power. Id.
at 385-86.
110. It must be noted that the principle that a state legislator should have no
interest in a state contract somewhat overlaps the prohibition against legislative
self-dealing. However, the self-dealing restriction is violated only by participation
in a governmental matter in which the legislator has a private interest, while public
participation is generally not required under the contract prohibition - the legislato.-'s
interest alone violates the statute. Buss, supra note 5, at 366. Yet, those statutes
which prohibit personal interest in a governmental contract may be aimed at
public participation as well as private interests. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1090
(West Supp. 1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 7 (1970). Clearly, those
statutes proscribing contracts upon which the interested legislator votes are directed
at legislative participation in governmental activity affecting the legislator's private
interests. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 61.096(2) (1971).
A further difference between the self-dealing and contract prohibitions is
that a self-dealing prohibition can be avoided by mere abstention from participation,
while the provision against interest in a contract forces the solon to choose between
his government employment generally and his private interest. Finally, the contract
restriction is limited to state contracts while the self-dealing prohibition applies
to all matters in which the state may be involved or interested. Buss, supra note 5,
at 366.
111. See, e.g., State Adverse Interest Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 776.1 et seq.
(1962). This statute prohibits a state advisor, consultant, or appointment employee
from having any "adverse interest" in a contract upon which he advised or consulted
or which was made by his employer/agency. Further, the act provides that no one
with an adverse interest in a state contract is eligible for employment with the
contracting agency, and state employees are forbidden both from influencing the
making of a state contract in which they are interested and from representing any
outsider before a state agency. Id.
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tracts.1 1 2 The prohibitions contained in sections 5(b), (c), and (d) would
apply to certain situations in which the member is interested in a state
contract, but they scarcely cover the whole problem.
As discussed above, the gist of the offense defined in section 5(c)
is participation by the legislator as a principal in a matter in which he
is interested, and, accordingly, it would prohibit a member's interest in a
state contract only if he, as a state official, had personal controlling
authority with respect to the award of the contract. 11-3 However, section
5(c) can easily be avoided by abstention," 4 but abstention does not neces-
sarily prevent a legislator's private interests from influencing the alloca-
tion of public funds. The danger of reciprocal dealing exists since his
colleagues might favor his personal interest, with the expectation that
they might later enjoy similar sympathetic treatment.
Thus, in this particular problem area, a proscription against the
interest, rather than the participation, would seem necessary if conflicts
are to be avoided and the appearance of propriety is to be maintained in
the awarding of public contracts. Hence, it is submitted that section
5(c), while an effective deterrent to self-dealing by an interested legis-
lator," 5 is inadequate to cope with the more subtle problem of recipro-
cal dealing.
The applicability of section 5(b) and (d) to the contract situation is
even more limited than that of section 5(c). Under section 5(b) and (d)
the only interest in the contract which would be prohibited would be the
receipt of compensation or some "thing of economic value" for aiding the
private contractor in procurement of the contract." 6 Under section 5(b)
the aid furnished would have to consist of consultation which concerns
general assembly matters or which draws upon confidential information. 117
Section 5(d) applies to the contract situation only to the extent that the
member "assists" the private contractor and even then does not absolutely
ban such assistance. The section merely conditions assistance upon the
disclosure of certain information filed with the chief clerk of the house
or with the secretary of the senate., 18 All of the activities covered by
these prohibitions should be foreclosed to the legislator with respect to
state contracts, but none of the provisions is directed specifically at the
situation in which a member has a private interest in a state contract, and
none of them, either separately or collectively, is sufficiently extensive to
adequately cover the entire contract problem.
112. Legislative Code of Ethics §§ 1-8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 143.1-143.8
(1969). The complete text of the Legislative Code of Ethics is set forth in an
appendix to this Comment.
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(c) (1969). See notes 80-96 and accompanying
text supra.
114. Cf. text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
115. See notes 77-110 and accompanying text supra.
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 143.5(b), (d) (1969).
117. Id. § 143.5(b).
118. Id. § 143.5(d).
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There is a provision in the Pennsylvania constitution which com-
mands that the general assembly maintain a competitive bidding system
by law for all state purchasers, and which provides that such a law is to
prohibit state officials and employees from being interested in such pur-
chases.'1 9 It would appear that this provision is not self-executing, but
requires implementing legislation. However, there are no statutes in
Pennsylvania which extend this prohibition to state legislators. The Legis-
lative Code of Ethics is the logical place for the legislature to satisfy this
constitutional requirement, and a prohibition against public officials and
employees having personal interest in state contracts should be added. 20
Although the Code contains no direct prohibition of a member's
interest in state contracts, it might do so by implication. Section 5(e)
provides several exceptions which, despite the fact that they affect other
prohibitions of the Code, apply most specifically and directly to the con-
tract situation. Thus, section 5(e) (4) permits the legislator to share in
compensation received by a "person" in which the member has a pro-
prietary interest when the compensation was received pursuant to a state
contract awarded through competitive bidding, or by direct engagement
in emergency situations in which the law permits dispensation of bid-
ding. 12' According to commentators, the theory behind such an exception
is that the bidding procedure leaves little or no discretion to the con-
tracting agency, and thereby eliminates the possibility of improper influ-
ence and favoritism. 122 In addition, it has been argued that disqualification
of a business enterprise which submits the best bid merely because a
legislator has an interest in the entity unduly restricts the state by forc-
ing it to accept work done at greater expense.123
The language of section 5(e) (4) indicates that it exempts only con-
tracts between the state and some "person" in which the member has an
interest, but does not exempt contracts between the state and the legislator
himself, assuming such a prohibition is to be implied. Such a reading of
the section is at least inferentially supported by the proviso that the excep-
tion granted does not apply where the member has assisted in the pro-
curement of the "person's" bid or engagement without bidding.' 24 This
119. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 22, provides in pertinent part:
The [competitive bidding] law shall provide that no officer or employe of the
Commonwealth shall be in any way interested in any purchase made by the
Commonwealth under contract or otherwise.
Id.
120. Apparently PA. CONST. art. 3, § 22 has been totally ignored, at least by the
Pennsylvania legislature. The prohibition mandated by or contained in that provision
is worded so as to permit no exceptions. However, in section 5(e) of the Code,
the general assembly has included two exceptions which appear directed primarily
at the contract situation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 143.5(e) (4), (6) (1969).
These exceptions would not be valid under a literal reading of the Pennsylvania
constitution.
121. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (4) (1969).
122. Note, supra note 9, at 1225. But see note 149 infra.
123. Note, supra note 5, at 459.
124. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(e) (4), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (4)
(1969). This proviso is actually directed at self-dealing by the member in the
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proviso is justified because the member is doubly serving the state
when he acts as a government procurer as well as a legislator.125  It is
submitted that the intended impact of section 5(e)(4) was that competi-
tive bidding or emergency situations should excuse a private interest only
where the legislator's interest is indirect in both the private and public
aspects. Accordingly, section 5(e)(4) should be read as affecting only
those situations where the member's private interest is indirect through
another person and the member's public role is limited to his general
legislative duties.
However, the practical effect of section 5(e) (4)'s distinction may be
negligible, even if a contract prohibition were implied, because a legislator
desiring to contract with the state could simply set up a dummy corpora-
tion through which he could submit bids. In the event a bid were accepted,
he would be within the exception of section 5(e) (4). In order to prevent
such evasive tactics, an effective ethics committee is necessary to closely
scrutinize such transactions and to refuse to grant exemptions where the
contract is with another "person" in form only.
12
3
Section 5(e) (6) also contains several exceptions which are most
specifically and directly applicable to the contract situation. Section
5(e) (6) (i) excepts contracts in which the "total interest of the member
and his immediate family in the persons receiving said compensation is
less than ten per cent."'1 27 Although the provision does not so state, the
10 per cent interest apparently means ownership or control of 10 per cent
of the total outstanding proprietary interests or stock in the "person.' 1 28
situation where the legislator not only has an interest in the contract but actively
aids in the procurement thereof as a government official. Where the legislator is
the contracting party, he is actively participating in the contracting process, and
this situation would seem to come within the purpose of the proviso if not its
express language.
125. See Buss, supra note 5, at 368.
126. See notes 300-19 and accompanying text infra.
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (6) (i) (1969).
128. There is still a problem with respect to the situation where the member
is personally interested in the contract even though he has little or no proprietary
interest in the contracting entity. An example of such a case would be the situation
in which the legislator is also a member or employee of a firm which holds a
state contract; if the legislator's salary depends upon the contract, he is interested in
the contract even though he owns no part of the firm.
It would appear that there is no non-proprietary interest problem in those
states whose statutes provide in effect that no "person" of which the member and/or
his family owns or controls 10 per cent or more shall contract with the state
except pursuant to competitive bidding. The language of such acts apparently limits
the disqualifying interest to those which are proprietary. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1292 (Supp. 1971) ; N.Y. PUB. OFFICERs LAW § 73(4) (McKinney Supp.
1972). However, since many statutory provisions governing contracts merely forbid
the member from being interested, and exempt certain de minimis proprietary interests,
the question is presented whether non-proprietary interests are excluded as well,
or whether the reference to proprietary interests in the exception can be taken
as indicating that the unmodified term "interest" in the prohibition means only
proprietary interest. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 7 (1970).
It has been argued that the existence of the de minimis interest exception
should not be read as excluding non-proprietary interests from the contract prohibition.
Buss, supra note 5, at 376. Where the interested non-owner member is in a
position to directly benefit from his firm's state contract, as in the example given
above, the risk and public appearance of favoritism might be as great as where
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The apparent reason for such an exception is that it is presumed that
where the member's interest in the contract is remote or de minimis
there is no motive for corruption and there is, as a practical matter, no
real conflict. However, this rationale is not totally applicable to section
5(e) (6) (i). By stating the exception only in terms of percentage owner-
ship, the provision might exempt interests of a member in a contracting
"person" which are significant enough not to be really de minimis, while
leaving interests truly de minimis in amount within the prohibition,
assuming, again, that one is to be implied. 129 Therefore, it is submitted
that a more justifiable exception would result if section 5(e)(6)(i)
required personal economic interests to meet both a 10 per cent test and
a specified dollar amount test before qualifying as de minimis. 130
The Pennsylvania de minimis interest exception does not permit the
member himself to contract with the state. Only a contract with a
"person" of which he and his family own less than a 10 per cent interest
falls within the exemption. The practical significance of this distinction
might be limited by the ability of a legislator to create a dummy corpora-
tion through which he could contract with the state. However, an evasion
the legislator's interest is whole or partial ownership of the firm, and, if so, the
contract should be prohibited. However, there is an argument that the de minimis
interest exception indicates that the legislature believed that insubstantial interests
are not sufficient to trigger the contract prohibition and that non-proprietary interests
are generally insignificant. Since it cannot be said in the abstract that all non-
proprietary interests are insubstantial, it is submitted that this problem can be
best resolved on an ad hoc basis by determining whether the reasons behind the
prohibition or those underlying the de minimis exception apply in a particular case.
The Pennsylvania general assembly should enact a contract prohibition which leaves
open the opportunity for case by case determinations instead of expressly or in-
ferentially excluding all non-proprietary interests.
129. For example, if legislator A owns 9 per cent of the stock of a publicly
held corporation, X which has 1,000,000 shares outstanding at a market value of
$10.00 per share, A's monetary interest in X is $900,000.00 and his interest may be
controlling. Yet, since the exception is stated in terms of 10 per cent ownership or
control, A's quite substantial interest in the corporation would not bar a state contract
with X. On the other hand, if legislator B owns 40 per cent of the 1,000 shares
of a closely held corporation, Y, which have a market value of $2.00 per share, due,
perhaps, to restrictions on alienation and the management-control structure of Y
(of which B is not a part), his interest, although noncontrolling and worth only
$800 on the market, would bar a state contract with Y.
An alternative standard of a specific dollar amount may similarly lead
to incongruous results. To illustrate, assume a de minimis exception fixing $5,000
as the maximum qualifying amount. If legislator B owns 60 per cent of the out-
standing shares of Y, his monetary interest would be $1,200.00 and his controlling
interest would not bar a state contract with Y even though he stands to gain
considerably from one. However, if legislator C owns 5 per cent of the 2,000 out-
standing shares of a close corporation, Q, which have a market value of $60.00
per share, a state contract with Q would be barred even though C's 5 per cent interest
may, as a practical matter, be worth much less than B's interest in Y.
130. California has taken a different approach in conditioning its de minimis
exception to instances where the member's proprietary interest is less than 3 per cent
in a corporation, and the dividends and other payments derived from that corporation
do not exceed 5 per cent of his total annual income. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1091.5
(West Supp. 1973). While it seems correct that the importance of the interest
to the individual legislator and thus the temptation for wrongdoing will vary
according to the percentage of his total income involved, it would appear that
sole reliance on a percentage formula may allow significant dollar amounts to
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of section 5(e) (6) (i) by this route would be more difficult in practice
than would a similar attempt to evade the bidding exception of section
5(e) (4) because the member could not be the sole owner of the dummy
"person" and still come within section 5(e) (6) (i); he would have to
organize the company with others so that he and his immediate family
own less than 10 per cent.
The de minimis exception in Pennsylvania, however, as in most
other states, 3 1 is excessively broad in that each corporate proprietary
interest is considered separately in determining whether that interest is
de minimis. Thus, a member might have interests in several corporations
doing government business, and derive most of his income therefrom, yet
fall within the exception of section 5(e) (6) (i) if his interests do not
exceed 10 per cent in any one corporation. One apparent modification
which would curb such possible excesses as suggested above would be
the addition of a proviso to section 5(e) (6) (i) which would stipulate
that the aggregate income of a member derived through "persons" receiv-
ing compensation from the state could not exceed a set percentage of his
total income, or, more effectively, a fixed dollar amount. Of course, such
a clause could only be effective if disclosure of a member's financial in-
terests were required and an effective ethics committee existed to review
the required disclosure statements. 3 2
In addition to the de minimis interest exception, section 5(e) (6)
contains two other exemptions aimed directly and specifically at the con-
tract situation. Section 5(e) (6) (iii) exempts the receipt of compensa-
tion as a result of the state's purchase of "newspaper advertising required
by law."' 33 Section 5(e) (6) (ii) excludes from the contract prohibition,
assuming one is implied, the receipt of compensation by the member, or a
"person" in which he is interested, when the recipient is the exclusive sup-
plier of property or services purchased by the state.13 4 This exception is jus-
tified since the state might otherwise, on occasion, be totally deprived of
needed land, goods, or services were it not able to deal with a legislator. 35
However, a claim of "exclusive supplier" status should be closely scru-
tinized in order to assure that the contracting agency has not slanted the
contract specification to artificially make the member, or "person" in
which he holds an interest, the sole supplier.
In the exclusive supply situation, there is an acute danger that the
privately interested member may receive an unconscionable profit at the
state's expense. While the need for a particular product or property may
justify this exception on occasion, it is anomolous to disallow conflicts
generally, but not when the government official is successful to the extent
of maintaining a monopoly position. Accordingly, it is submitted that a
131. See note 141 and accompanying text infra.
132. See notes 273-319 and accompanying text infra.
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (6) (iii) (1969).
134. Id. § 143.5(e) (6) (ii).
135. Cf. Note, supra note 9, at 1227.
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disclosure requirement should be introduced into section 5(e) (6) (ii)
which would necessitate a public statement of both the legislator's interest
and the particulars of the contract if the exception is to take effect. 136
Unlike Pennsylvania, other states which employ a statutory approach
to the regulation of governmental conflicts of interest have placed express
restrictions upon the freedom of the legislator, or business entities in
which he holds an interest, to contract with the state. Apparently, how-
ever, no state has absolutely prohibited all such contracts. Some merely
require that legislators engaged in business activity with the state to file
a statement with a designated official disclosing their interests in govern-
mental transactions. 3 7 Other states, concerned with the more flagrant
violation of the contract principle, prohibit their legislators from having
an interest in a contract made by either branch of the legislature ;138 some
merely proscribe contracts upon which the interested legislator may
vote. 139 Most of the remaining states prohibit contracts between a legis-
lator, or entity in which he has an interest, and a state department or
agency. However, certain exemptions are generally made to this pro-
hibition, the most common being a competitive bidding exception similar
to Pennsylvania Code section 5(e) (4)140 and a de minimis interest ex-
ception similar to section 5(e) (6) (i) .141 Only the New York Statute
contains an exception comparable to section 5(e) (6) (iii),142 and appar-
ently no other state exempts the exclusive supplier situation as does
section 5(e) (6) (ii).
It is submitted that Pennsylvania should follow the lead of those
states which directly prohibit legislators from contracting with the state.
Notwithstanding the lack of an express prohibition however, the Pennsyl-
vania competitive bidding and de minimis exceptions are generally com-
mendable. The Pennsylvania competitive bidding exception is not as
136. For a discussion of the present disclosure requirements under the Legislative
Code of Ethics, see notes 279-82 and accompanying text infra.
137. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(2) (1973). Where the personal interest
is "remote," the California statute requires disclosure of the legislator's interest to
the house of which he is a member and ratification of the contract by that body
before it is valid. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1091 (a) (West Supp. 1973).
138. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 7 (1970).
139. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.096(2) (1971).
140. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1292 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 7 5-4304(a) (Supp. 1972) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.096(6) (1971);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 7 (1970); MicH. COMP. LAWS § 15.304(d)
(Supp. 1973) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.09 (Page 1954).
141. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1292 (Supp. 1971) (interest 10 per cent
or less; contract less than $1000) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.096(6) (1971) (owner-
ship 10 per cent or less; $25 contract) ; MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 15.304 (Supp. 1973)
(1 per cent ownership of stock not listed on stock exchange or, where stock is
listed, ownership of stock with present market value of less than $25,000); N.Y.
PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(4) (McKinney Supp. 1972) (10 per cent or less interest;
$25 contract) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2919.09, .11 (Page 1954) (contract value
of $50 or less; 5 per cent or $500 ownership whichever is the lesser).
142. N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(4) (McKinney Supp. 1972) (provision
of legal notices or advertisements in newspapers designated by law for that purpose
and for which rates are fixed by law). Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4304 (Supp.
1972) (exception for contracts for which price or rates fixed by law).
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broad as those of most states with comparable provisions in that section
5(e) (4) does not exempt a member from personally contracting with
the state.143  Although, as mentioned above, this distinction may make
no practical difference, the Pennsylvania approach is more appropriate
because it affords a court the opportunity to prevent a legislator from
doubly serving the state. Moreover, even with its limitations, section
5(e) (6) (i)'s de minimis interest exception is more stringent than cor-
responding exceptions in a majority of other states' statutes. The Penn-
sylvania provision exempts the receipt of compensation only where the
member and his immediate family own less than 10 per cent of the con-
tracting party while most other states' exceptions permit contracting
where the member or his family own less than the stated percentage.1
4 4
The latter type provision affords a legislator the opportunity to evade
the contract prohibition by transferring enough of his investments to his
spouse so that neither one of them owns more than the maximum per-
centage allowed, 45 a loophole not present in Pennsylvania because of the
language of section 5(e) (6) (i).
46
Under section 5(e) of the Code, and the conflicts legislation of every
other state except Massachusetts, 47 the legislator need only establish that
he is within one of the applicable exceptions and he is exempt from the
,contract prohibition. That is, the member is exempt if the contract is
let by bidding or his interest in the contracting "person" is de minimis or
the service purchased is newspaper advertising or, in Pennsylvania, he
or the "person" in which he has an interest is the exclusive supplier.
However, stringent controls of the contract situation are needed because
of the abundance of opportunities for dishonest legislators to exploit
their influence with those responsible for letting government contracts.
Since public confidence in the integrity of government is weakened when-
tever a legislator is interested in a state contract, 148 and because the
143. See note 140 supra for a compilation of state statutes which permit legislators
to personally contract with the state in a competitive bidding situation.
144. See, e.g., ARIM. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1292 (Supp. 1971).
145. Since the interest of the legislator's immediate family is his interest in a
practical sense, such a statute would permit state contracts with a "person" of
which the member in effect controlled almost 20 per cent (the member himself
'9.5 per cent and his immediate family 9.5 per cent). Id.
146. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (6) (i) (1969). Of course, this provision
does not completely close the loophole because the member can still manipulate his
and his immediate family's interest in conjunction with those of relatives not
within his immediate family and evade the prohibition, This could be prevented by
,extending the prohibition to cover interests of relatives further removed than the
member's immediate family, see, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1292 (Supp. 1971),
or prohibiting any contract between the state and a "person" who makes or holds
the state contract for the legislator's benefit or on his account, regardless of the
-extent of the member's interest in the "person." See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.096(6) (1971). See Comment, supra note 7, at 385. This latter prohibition could
prove too nebulous for a criminal statute and might be handled more appropriately
by a general code of ethics.
147. See notes 140-41 supra.
148. It should be remembered that one of the express purposes of the Legislative
Code of Ethics is to "protect the public confidence in its Legislature." Legislative
Code of Ethics § 2(4), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.2(4) (1969).
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theories behind the bidding and de minimis interest exceptions are not
convincing as a practical matter,'149 it is submitted that the Massachusetts
approach of combining these two exceptions should be adopted by the
Pennsylvania general assembly. Under this approach, the member, or
"person" in which he is interested, may contract with the state only if the
contract is let by competitive bidding and the legislator's interest in the
"person" is less than 10 per cent.150 The exceptions provided in sections
5(e) (6) (ii) and (iii) of the Pennsylvania Code can be left as alterna-
tives, although a disclosure requirement would be beneficial in each case
so that the contracting agency and the public are at least aware of the
member's interest.' 5 ' Regardless of what the general assembly does with
respect to the exceptions, it should and must enact a specific prohibition
directing that no member of the state legislature is to be interested in
a state contract.
C. Assisting Outsiders in Dealings with the Government
A third basic conflict of interest principle is that "public officials
should not in general be permitted to step out of their official roles to
assist private entities or persons in their dealings with government.'
u
'12
The most obvious situation that falls within this principle is that in which
a public official or employee actually represents a private party before
a state agency. However, the principle is not limited to representation and
would forbid any assistance to the private party by the official or em-
ployee. As with the contract principle, focus is centered upon the private
activity of the official - he need not have any connection with the
governmental agency or department involved nor any contact in his
public capacity with the matter with respect to which the assistance is
afforded. 153 The principle is based upon the premise that a public official
will have influence or involvement with agencies or departments other
than his own, and reflects a policy which demands undivided loyalty to
the government without regard to whether any actual exploitation of
public office is possible. 154 With respect to state legislators in particular,
there is an even greater danger that the agency will be susceptible to
influence and that the member will have an unfair advantage because
149. See text accompanying notes 124-25 supra. Since the contracting agency
is generally authorized to award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, the
agency retains a good deal of discretion (it may accept a higher bid on the grounds
that the bidder is more responsible), Note, Conflict of Interests: State Government
Employees, 47 VA. L. REV. 1034, 1055 (1961), and regardless of how it is awarded
or the extent of the member's interest in the contracting "person," a state contract
in which a member of the legislature is interested creates the appearance of
impropriety. See Comment, supra note 7, at 383.
150. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 7 (1970). There is also an absolute
exemption if the member's interest is less than 1 per cent. Id.
151. See Note, supra note 64, at 681-82; Note, supra note 8, at 457. See also,
notes 273-99 and accompanying text infra.
152. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1120 (emphasis omitted).
153. Buss, supra note 5, at 323; Perkins, supra note 7, at 1120.
154. Buss, supra note 5, at 323.
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of the numerous controls that the legislative branch exercises over state
agencies. 155 Moreover, as with all conflict of interest situations, a legis-
lator's assistance to an outsider in dealing with the government creates
the public appearance of unethical conduct.
However, this principle apparently cannot be applied without reserva-
tion to state legislators' 56 because, traditionally, it has been deemed per-
missible for a member to aid his constituents in dealings with the state
bureaucracy, and such action is usually considered improper only when
done for profit.' 57 Accordingly, the Legislative Code of Ethics does not
absolutely prohibit assistance to outsiders by legislators. Section 5(d) of
the Code merely prohibits the receipt, or entry into an agreement to receive
compensation'-" "for assisting any person in any transaction involving
the Commonwealth or any of its officials or agencies" unless the member
files a written statement disclosing certain specified information. 59 Thus,
the Code actually does not prohibit the compensated assistance itself, but
merely requires disclosure - assistance without disclosure is forbidden. 60
Notwithstanding the lack of an absolute prohibition, section 5(d)
is quite broad in scope. The section is applicable not only when the mem-
ber actually receives compensation for services rendered in assisting the
outsider, but also when he agrees to receive compensation for services
rendered or to be rendered. The latter provision prevents the evasion of
155. Comment, supra note 7, at 385-86; Note, supra note 5 at 459; Note, supra
note 64, at 684. See also note Ill supra. The rationale of both the contract and the
outside assistance prohibitions are essentially the same.
156. Perkins asserts that this principle is very stringent when applied to any
governmental employee or official, on the state or federal level. Perkins, supra
note 7, at 1120-21.
157. Some states specifically provide that their conflict of interests statute cannot
be construed to restrict a member's acting for a constituent without compensation
before a state agency. Such a section would be an appropriate addition to the
Legislative Code of Ethics. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9.4(n)
(Supp. 1972). See also, Comment, supra note 7, at 385-88.
158. See note 45 supra.
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(d) (1969). The complete text of the
Legislative Code of Ethics is set forth in an appendix to this Comment.
Although disclosure is the essence of section 5(d), the scope and method
of the disclosure required will not be discussed at this point but rather will be
handled in a separate disclosure section. See notes 273-99 and accompanying text
infra.
160. It must be noted that sections 5(a) and (b) also prohibit some form of
legislator assistance to outsiders. Section 5(a) forbids the legislator from engaging
in compensated lobbying or voting in the general assembly, in which situation he is
assisting the person who wants the legislation in question either passed or defeated.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(a) (1969). For a full discussion of section 5(a)
see notes 190-201 and accompanying text infra. Section 5(b) prohibits the member
from compensated consultation which is devoted to matters before, or the operations
of, the general assembly or which draws upon confidential information. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(b) (1969). For a more thorough analysis of section 5(b),
see notes 224-31 and accompanying text infra. However, there is no aspect of dealing
with the government involved in either the 5(a) or 5(b) situation.
The provision of section 4 that no member shall "[ulse or attempt to use
his official position to secure unwarranted privileges or exemptions for himself or
others" would apply in situations involving assistance to outsiders. Legislative Code
of Ethics, § 4(3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.4(3) (1969). See Note, supra
note 64, at 685.
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the disclosure requirement by postponing payment until after the legis-
lator's term. To fully preclude such evasion, the phrase "any agreement
with any person for compensation" should be broadly construed to in-
clude not only formal agreements but also informal understandings or
arrangements.
1' 1
The activity of the member covered by section 5(d) is assistance to
an outsider; the Code broadly defines "assist" to mean to "act, or agree to
act, in such a way as to help, aid, advise, furnish information to, or
otherwise provide assistance to another person."'1 2 However, due to the
definition of "assist" in section 3(3), section 5(d) contains a mens rea
requirement, for the member must not only believe his activity will aid
the outsider but must also act with the intent to assist such "person" in
order to be subject to the disclosure requirement.
63
Finally, the section is broad with respect to the type of assistance
which will trigger the disclosure requirement since it extends to assistance
"in any transaction involving the Commonwealth or any of its officials
or agencies."'1 64 As discussed above, "transaction involving the Common-
wealth" is defined by the Code to include any matter in which the state
has more than a remote interest.' 65 Since section 5(d) also applies to
assistance in a transaction involving any state official or agency, the mem-
ber is apparently required to disclose his assistance even if the state's in-
terest is remote, provided one of its officials or agencies has a direct interest.
It should be noted that section 5(d) does not require that the interest
of the outsider assisted be adverse to that of the state. Although there is
no public-private interest conflict when the outsider's interest in a matter
is consistent with that of the state, and although the member may be
serving the state while assisting the outsider, it will often be very difficult
to determine whether, in a given case, the interests are in fact consistent.
Furthermore, even if the private and state interests are the same, the mem-
ber's assistance of the outsider may enable him to use his official position
for personal gain, action clearly against the public interest. 166
161. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the purposes of the act
because there is as much a tendency for exploitation of official position and
impairment of public confidence with informal arrangements as with formal agreements.
See Legislative Code of Ethics § 2(d), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.2(3) (1969).
It is clear that the agreement for compensation can be implied and still come within
section 5(d), because the last paragraph of the section requires filing of the
member's disclosure statement "within ten days from the date such agreement,
express or implied, was entered into." Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(d) (4), PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(d) (4) (1969). It is not clear whether this means only
such agreements as would be considered implied agreements under the law of
contracts, but it is submitted that it should not be so restricted.
162. Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(3)
(1969).
163. Id.
164. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(d), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(d)
(1969).
165. Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(12), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(12)
(1969). See notes 88-89 and accompanying text supra.
166. Buss, supra note 5, at 332-33. Buss, however, argues that where the member
is assisting the outsider in a cooperative venture with the state, the prohibition (or
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Many state legislators are lawyers who, because of the part-time
nature of their public employment and the low salary, must maintain
their private legal practices in order to support themselves and their
families. A statute which absolutely prohibits legislators from assisting
outsiders in dealings with the state, or in matters in which the state is
interested, might eliminate many attorneys from legislative service because
it would prevent them from handling criminal, tax, and other matters.
167
Accordingly, most states prohibiting legislators from privately dealing in
matters concerning the state make an exception for lawyer-legislators, at
least in the case where the proceeding is before a court, or is reviewable
by a court. 168 However, since the Pennsylvania Code requires only dis-
closure, exception of lawyer-legislators from this requirement appears
difficult to justify. Nevertheless, section 5(e) (7) provides that a lawyer-
legislator is not subject to section 5(d)'s disclosure requirement when he
receives compensation for representing an interest adverse to the state
in certain specified proceedings. 16 9
Section 5(e)( 7 )'s requirement that the interest represented must be
adverse to the state is notable since it signifies that a legislator's assist-
ance to an outsider whose interest is consistent with that of the state
would remain within the prohibition of section 5(d), °70 regardless of the
type of proceeding involved, even though the situation would create less
of a conflict of interest than one in which the outsider's interest is ad-
verse to that of the state. Furthermore, it should be noted that section
5 (e) (7) is not a blank authorization allowing lawyer-legislators to practice
before the state, but rather exempts only certain specified activities. The
first kind of proceeding in which a member's compensated representation
is exempt from the disclosure requirement is a judicial proceeding; the
second is a proceeding not initially before a court but with respect to
which the state has the right to judicial review.' 71 Protection of the
public is assured in these situations since the courts, being independent
of the legislature, are not nearly as susceptible to legislative influence as
are state agencies. 172 The third and final type of proceeding specified in
in Pennsylvania, the disclosure requirement) should not apply. Nevertheless, it is
submitted that the problem can best be handled on an ad hoc basis instead of
conclusively construing the statute one way or the other.
167. Buss, supra note 5, at 333; Comment, supra note 7, at 388. But see Note,
supra note 9, at 1228, wherein it is asserted that leaving the lawyer-legislator free
to pursue his tax, criminal and licensing practice dilutes the purpose for the general
rule against outsider assistance "because of the adverse positions of the legislator
and the state government and because of the opportunity for or appearance of
influence or partiality in the course of prosecution or settlement."
168. See note 185 and accompanying text infra.
169. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (7) (1969). This exception would have
no application to the other provisions of section 5 because none of them involve
the representation of any outside interests against the state.
170. See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
171. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(e) (7), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (7)
(1969).
172. The second exception designated by section 5(e) (7) covers "proceeding[s]
. . . where the Commonwealth has a right to judicial review in a proceeding not
initially before the court . . . ." Id. Since some right to judicial review exists as
[VOL. 19
27
Shellenberger and Hardt: Legislative Conflicts of Interest - An Analysis of the Pennsylvan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
NOVEMBER 1973]
section 5(e) (7) is one which "involves only . . .uncontested and routine
action ...in issuing or renewing a license, charter, certificate or similar
document.' u 3 The public interest is safeguarded in such a proceeding
because it is one in which the employee's or official's discretion, and thus
the possibility of favoritism, is limited. However, such a proceeding
should be closely scrutinized to assure that the action is not uncontested
and routine due to the member's influence.
It is submitted that these three exceptions should be narrowly con-
strued since they enumerate deviations from general policy and include
situations in which the public interest is especially protected by the judicial,
quasi-judicial, or routine nature of the proceeding. It seems apparent
that section 5(e) (7) cannot be read as exempting all lawyer-like conduct
by a legislator. The lawyer's role includes negotiation, compromise, and
entreaty, all of which are too similar to the legislator's public duties to
allow an undisclosed mingling - and conflict - of roles. 174 Since the
danger of a legislator's public duties being subterfuged by private interests
when he is allowed to represent clients before agencies which he super-
vises as a member of the overseeing legislative committee appears great
enough to justify the proscription of such acts, the section 5(e) (7)
exemption of lawyers from even disclosing the nature of their representa-
tion seems especially unwarranted.
As Pennsylvania, no state which has taken a statutory approach to
conflict problems, with the exceptions of Illinois 175 and Massachusetts ,17
to most administrative decisions made by an agency, this clause might be read to
exempt all contacts made by a lawyer-legislator in regard to any pending administrative
decision. While the term "proceeding" in itself probably indicates an intent to
include only formal, quasi-judicial hearings, it is submitted that the section be
amended to cover only proceedings in which a public record is maintained. Besides
narrowing the scope of the exception, such a provision would also allow a more
effective judicial review and insure the exposure of the legislator's actions to the
test of public opinion.
173. Id.
174. A recent controversy has highlighted the problem of legislators mingling
their public duties and private practices. A former chief counsel for the Pennsylvania
State Liquor Control Board recently testified before the Pennsylvania House Liquor
Control Committee that he had several meetings with a member of that committee
in which he "could never clearly distinguish whether [the legislator] was representing
a client or a constituent." Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 2, 1973, § 1, at 2, col. 1 (final
city ed.). It should be noted that while an ethics code is ostensibly a prohibition
against certain conduct, it also acts to implicitly condone behavior not specifically
proscribed. Thus, the state representative asserted that his undisclosed actions in
assisting private parties before the Liquor Control Board as a lawyer on a fee
basis were not inconsistent with his official status as a legislator on the overseeing
liquor control committee, since, in his opinion, such action is specifically permitted
under section 5(e) (7). Philadelphia Evening Bulletin. Aug. 2, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 1
(two star suburban west ed.). A bill has been proposed by Governor Shapp which
would bar lawyer-legislators from practicing before state agencies. H.B. No. 1347,
General Assembly of Pennsylvania (1973 Sess.). See Philadelphia Evening Bulletin,
Sept. 17, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 8 (two start suburban west ed.).
175. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 603-105 to -106 (Smith-Hurd 1967) ; id. § 602-104
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
176. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 4(c) (1970). The Massachusetts
statute not only prohibits a legislator from receiving compensation in relation to"any particular matter" in which the state or a state agency has a "direct and
substantial interest," but also forbids the member from acting as an agent or
attorney with respect to such a matter regardless of compensation. Id.
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has restricted legislative assistance to private parties unless the member
receives some form of compensation for such assistance. 7 7 The statutes
generally limit the legislator's freedom to appear as the representative
of an outsider only before state agency proceedings or with respect to
matters before such agencies. 178 Furthermore, those states which prohibit
such compensated activity further limit their prohibitions based on the
nature of the state's interest in the matter 1 79 or the character of the com-
pensation received by the legislator, 8 0 or forbid participation only with
respect to certain agencies.' 8 ' The remaining states do not prohibit the
legislator's assistance, but only require that he publicly disclose all com-
pensated appearances before state agencies.'
8 2
Texas combines the two approaches by requiring registration state-
ments from all legislators appearing before state agencies' 83 and by pro-
hibiting compensated representation by a legislator before a state agency
when legislation affecting that agency is pending before the legislature or any
committee of which the legislator is a member and when the contact is
not adversative or of public record.
84
Every state with definitive conflicts legislation has recognized the
problem that these restrictions pose for the lawyer-legislator. Accordingly,
each state exempts from its statutory provisions legal assistance to outsiders,
at least with respect to matters concerning court cases and appearances
177. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1291(4) (Supp. 1971); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 8920(b) (3) (West Supp. 1973) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:1143(D)(1)-(2)
(1965) ; N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
178. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1291(4) (Supp. 1971) ; CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 8920(b) (3) (West Supp. 1973) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 603-105 to -106
(Smith-Hurd 1967), id. § 602-104 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 42:1143(D)(1)-(2) (1965); N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1972). Apparently, the fact that most statutes which cover the outsider
assistance situation are made applicable only to appearances before state agencies or
to the rendering of services with respect to matters before such agencies permits
lawyer-legislators to maintain their private legal practices as much as possible.
Since a state court is not a state agency, these statutes do not restrict such legis-
lators from assisting outsiders in relation to court cases or from appearing in such
cases. Thus, the dual objectives of conflict of interest legislation are neatly balanced.
179. In Massachusetts, the state or a state agency must have a "direct and
substantial financial interest" in the matter. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A,
§ 4(c) (1970).
180. Under the New York statute, the member is prohibited from receiving
compensation for the rendering of services with respect to any matter before a state
agency if such "compensation is to be dependent or contingent upon any action by
such agency," but he is permitted to assist outsiders where the compensation re-
ceived is merely equal to the reasonable value of the services rendered. N.Y. PUB.
OFFICERS LAW § 73(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972). Similarly, Arizona prohibits the
receipt of compensation for the rendering of services where the compensation is
dependent upon "any improper influence or improper action" by the member. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1291(4) (Supp. 1971).
181. The California act prohibits only the member's appearance or participation
for profit with respect to licensing or regulatory matters before state professional
licensing or regulation boards, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8920(b) (3) (West Supp. 1973).
In Illinois the legislator is prohibited from participation in or acceptance of a
representation case before the state court of claims or industrial commission where
the state is a party. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127 § 602-104 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
182. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:1143(D)(1)-(2) (1965).
183. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 183-2.2 (Supp. 1972).
184. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9 § 4(1) (Supp. 1972).
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before judicial bodies, either by express exceptions similar to section
5(e) (7) of the Pennsylvania Code or by the limited scope of the pro-
visions themselves.
8 5
Since the coverage of Code section 5(d) is not limited to representa-
tive activity or state agency matters, the scope of the disclosure require-
ment is significantly broader than that of the corresponding provisions of
other states' legislation. In this respect, the Pennsylvania Code would
appear to be superior, since the actual and apparent conflicts of interest
prevalent in the outside assistance situation exist on a broader plane than
is covered by the provisions of other states' statutes. However, the Penn-
sylvania general assembly should follow the lead of those states which
actually prohibit certain outside assistance and amend section 5(d) so as
to forbid all compensated representation of outside interests before state
agencies by members, except that which properly falls within section
5(e) (7). Such a prohibition would cover the conduct which presents
the most obvious opportunities for favoritism and the clearest appearance
of unethical conduct. With respect to the other forms of compensated
outside assistance, the present disclosure requirement of section 5(d)
appears adequate, but the representation presently exempted by section
5(e) (7) should also be subject to disclosure. Finally, it would be appro-
priate for the Pennsylvania general assembly to include a provision pro-
hibiting any "person" from offering compensation to a legislator for repre-
sentation of that "person" before a state agency, as is provided in the
Massachusetts statute.' 8 6 Such a provision would help deter the hiring
of legislators solely for their influence.
D. Outside Compensation and Discretionary Transfers
of Economic Value from Private Parties
to Legislators
The obvious danger presented by the situation in which a legislator
accepts gifts or compensation' 8 7 from private parties is that such transfers
185. Those states with statutes which merely restrict assistance in relation to
matters before state agencies exempt legislative participation in court cases by the
very fact that the statutes apply only to agency matters, and courts are not included
within the definition of agency. See note 178 supra. In Massachusetts, where the
prohibition is not so limited, the statute expressly excludes assistance by the legis-
lator with respect to the "collection of taxes, criminal fines or penalties, and fees or
charges for permits or licenses, and corporation fees." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 268A, § 4(c) (1970).
One commentator, while recognizing the need to balance the dual objectives
of conflicts legislation, argues that the better approach to the problem would be "to
preclude legislative representation of private interests only before those agencies
where egregious misconduct is likely or a demonstrable fact." Comment, supra
note 7, at 388. This would probably provide a broader exemption than the provisions
of the existing statutes, but it would be difficult to apply the suggested prohibition
due to its lack of specificity and it could be included only in a general code of ethics,
not a criminal statute.
186. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 4(b) (1970).
187. Clearly, there is a difference between gifts and compensation in this context
for the former denotes a transfer of value regardless of whether any services are
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might influence the member to perform his public duties in a manner
which may favor the donor. The clearest example of this situation is
the case in which the legislator is paid to lobby for, or influence, the
passage or defeat of a bill.' 88 The principle underlying the prohibition
of such gifts or compensation is simply that the member should be paid
only by the government for such government service. 8 9
The first part of section 5(a) of the Pennsylvania Code effectively
covers the outside gift or compensation situation by prohibiting the solici-
tation or receipt of any gift or compensation from an outsider which is
intended to, or which would, influence the member's performance of his
official duties. 190 The intent requirement refers to the state of mind of
the transferor and not that of the legislator-recipient. The potential
difficulties of proving that mental state are mitigated by the "or which
would influence" language which apparently provides an alternative objec-
tive test. Nevertheless, the additional intent requirement of section 5(a),
that the legislator himself know that the transfer is intended to, or would,
influence him, 19 greatly restricts the applicability of the prohibition be-
cause a dishonest legislator can merely deny such knowledge should he
face prosecution.
Although it has been argued that "the establishment of a clear dollar
limit for each calendar year would be the most promising method" of
dealing with the situation,' 92 it is submitted that the receipt of a gift or
compensation with knowledge or reason to know that it is intended to
or will influence the legislator-recipient should be prohibited regardless
of the size of the transfer because of the actual, potential, or apparent
misconduct involved. This is especially so when appropriate exceptions
have been provided to protect the legislator who receives legitimate gifts,
as in Pennsylvania. 93 Not only does section 5(a) adequately cover the
rendered by the donee in exchange, although the donor may often expect or intend to
influence the legislator's conduct through the gift. Compensation, on the other hand,
denotes the transfer of a thing of value in exchange for, or in consideration of, the
rendering of services by the legislator to the benefit of the transferor. See Legisla-
tive Code of Ethics §§ 3(4)-(5), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 143.3(4)-(5) (1969).
Nevertheless, both forms of transfer of economic value are often governed by the same
statutory provision. See Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46,
§ 143.5(a) (1969).
188. See note 184 supra.
189. See Perkins, supra note 7, at 1119. To enforce this principle, one commentator
has stated:
[P]ublic officials should not be allowed to accept transfers of economic value
from private sources, even though no bribery is involved, if the transfer is at the
discretion of the transferor as distinct from being pursuant to an enforceable
contract or property right of the public official.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
190. Legislative Code of Ethics § 5(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(a) (1969).
The complete text of the Legislative Code of Ethics is set forth in an appendix to
this Comment.
191. Id.
192. Comment, supra note 7, at 391. The author there argues that not all gifts
are equally culpable and that this should be recognized by the statute. Id. at 390.
However, a gift will at least create the appearance of impropriety, whatever its size.
193. See notes 195--201 and accompanying text infra.
[VOL. 19
31
Shellenberger and Hardt: Legislative Conflicts of Interest - An Analysis of the Pennsylvan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
NOVEMBER 1973]
general problem of outside gifts and compensation, problems of proof
of intent aside, but the second part of that section specifically proscribes
compensated lobbying by a legislator.9 4 Moreover, section 5(a) must be
commended for its express prohibition of a member's "sale" of his vote
on a bill, since such conduct by a legislator is the grossest form of im-
propriety and abuse of office.
With respect to the outside compensation or gift situation, section
5(e) of the Code includes provisions expressly excepting certain types of
gifts from the prohibition of section 5(a). Section 5(e)(1) permits the
member to receive "bona fide reimbursement, to the extent permitted by
law, for actual expenses for travel and such other necessary subsistence
as is compatible with this act and for which no Commonwealth payment
or reimbursement is made."' 95 The reason for this exemption is appar-
ently to permit the legislator to travel back and forth from Harrisburg
to his home district in order to meet with his constituents, and to do
whatever other traveling may be required in the performance of his duties
without being forced to shoulder the entire cost himself. This is consistent
with the need to balance the dual objectives of conflicts legislation.
A second exception is provided in section 5(e) (3) for the receipt
of "[alwards for meritorious public contribution given by public service
or civic organizations,"'196 the purpose of which is obvious. Third, section
5(e) (5) allows members to accept campaign contributions for meeting
campaign expenses. 97 Again, the need for balancing justifies this excep-
tion despite the obvious dangers,198 because qualified men and women would
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(a) (1969).
195. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (1) (1969). The effect of the phrase "to
the extent permitted by law" is not clear.
There is some overlap between this exception and the one provided by the
definition of "thing of economic value," which definition includes "any money or other
thing having economic value except food, drink, or refreshments consumed by an
official including reasonable transportation and entertainment incident thereto, while
the personal guest of some person." Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(11), PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(11) (1969). Since section 5(a) prohibits the receipt of "any
gift or compensation," which terms are defined to mean any "thing of economic
value," the exception mentioned in the definition of the latter phrase would apply to
section 5(a) by its own terms. See Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(4)-(5), PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 46, §§ 143.3(4)-(5) (1969).
196. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e) (3) (1969). Again there is some duplica-
tion with the exceptions created by the terms of section 5(a), since a "gift" excludes
public awards. Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(5), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(5)
(1969). However, since section 5(a) also prohibits the receipt of compensation, the
definition of which does not except public awards, the express exception of section
5(e) (3) is appropriate. Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(5), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46,
§ 143.3(4) (1969).
197. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(e)(5) (1969). Duplication exists with
respect to this exception as well, but the situation is similar to that with respect to
section 5(e)(3) so the express exception of section 5(3)(7) is justified. Legislative
Code of Ethics §§ 3(3), (4), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 143.3(3), (4). See note
196 supra.
198. One authority on state government has stated:
[O]ur present method of financing political campaigns is, in my estimation, the
single most corrupting factor in our political life - local, national, and es-
pecially state.
S. BAILEY, ETHICS AND THE POLITICIAN 7 (1960).
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be greatly discouraged from running for office if they were prohibited
from receiving campaign contributions and had to finance campaigns en-
tirely on their own. However, while safeguards against misconduct are
theoretically provided by the requirement that an accounting be made of
most campaign contributions pursuant to the Election Code, 9 9 it is sub-
mitted that greater protection should be provided by expressly exempting
only the receipt of political contributions for which an accounting is
required and made.
200
It must be recognized that the terms of section 5(a) itself exempt
certain receipts because, by definition, "gift" and "compensation" do not
include: (1) food and other refreshments, transportation, and entertain-
ment while a "person's" personal guest; (2) bona fide loans, property,
and contract interests; (3) public awards; and (4) certain political con-
tributions.2 0 ' Of course, these exceptions duplicate in part the applicable
exemptions of section 5(e).
Very few of the other states which have adopted a statutory approach
to legislative conflicts of interest have absolutely prohibited the receipt of
any gifts from private parties by the legislator,2°2 although several states
have provisions which forbid the member's acceptance of compensation
for his services from anyone other than the state.2 3 California and
Louisiana prohibit gifts or compensation related to legislative matters
with certain exceptions, 20 4 while other statutes provide that no legislator
199. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 3221-3233 (1963), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, §§ 3227, 3213 (Supp. 1972). Despite the fact that the Election Code requires
the filing of an expense account by a candidate for legislative office, the Pennsylvania
courts have not been very active or strict in enforcing the requirements of the law.
As one commentator has observed, "[t]he result of these decisions [under the Elec-
tion Code] is that a candidate must file and must keep account of his finances, but
will not be subject to sanctions if he does not follow the code as long as he claims
ignorance of the law or of the violation or can show his error was without willful
fraud or corruption." E.J. Tract, Regulation of Campaign Finance in Pennsylvania,
March 22, 1972 (unpublished manuscript on file in Professor William Valente's
office, Villanova University School of Law).
200. See note 199 supra.
201. Legislative Code of Ethics, §§ 3(4)-(5), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§
143.3(4)-(5) (1969). See notes 195-97 supra.
202. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.096(2) (1971); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
88 42.22.040(1), (2) (1972).
203. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8920(b) (4) (West Supp. 1973) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 112.313(7) (1973) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1143(A) (Supp. 1973);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, §§ 4(a), 11 (1970); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-9.4(a) (Supp. 1972) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.22.040(1), (2) (1972).
At least one commentator has asserted that the receipt of outside compensation would
come within the general prohibition contained in several statutes "against the
acceptance of employment which would impair the legislator's independent judgment
in the exercise of his official duties." Comment, supra note 7, at 393. However, this
general code of ethics standard would seem more obviously directed at restricting
a legislator's freedom to accept private employment during his term and will be dis-
cussed in connection with respect to that situation. See notes 236-42 and accom-
panying text infra.
204. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8920(b) (4) (West Supp. 1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 42:1143E(l), (3), (6) (1965). The California act exempts receipt of compensa-
tion for speeches or publications concerning the legislature and reimbursement for
traveling expenses not paid by the state, while the Louisiana statute contains excep-
tions almost identical to those provided in the Pennsylvania Code.
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shall accept any gift or service which is offered with the intent to im-
properly influence him in the performance of his official duties or respon-
sibilities, 20 5 or that might reasonably tend to so influence. 206 Illinois and
New York also prohibit the receipt of gifts in such a situation, but only
where the value of the gift exceeds a specified dollar amount.20 7 Finally,
although compensated lobbying would come within the general prohibition
of receipt of compensation from an outside source for the performance
of the member's official duties, 208 only Illinois, in addition to Pennsylvania,
specifically proscribes such conduct by a legislator.
20 9
Section 5(a) would appear to be a more extensive prohibition than
the comparable statutes of most other states. In the first part of that
section, the general assembly has combined prohibitions found in the
statutes of certain other states and, by prohibiting receipt of gifts or
compensation which is either intended or which would influence the
member's public performance, has avoided some of the vagueness which
plagues statutes which contain only the "which would" language,210 while
making the section broader in scope than those statutes which only con-
tain the intent requirement. 21 1 However, due to the problems of proof
presented by section 5(a)'s requirement of actual knowledge by the
member, it is submitted that the Pennsylvania legislature should amend
the section to require only constructive knowledge by providing a more
objective test, such as the one contained in the New York statute.212
205. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:13D-14 (Supp. 1973).
206. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 112.313(1) (1973); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-9.4(a) (Supp. 1972).
207. Illinois proscribes the solicitation or receipt of gifts with an aggregate value
of greater than $100 from any one person in a calendar year where the circumstances
reasonably create an inference that a major purpose behind the gifts was to influence
the member's performance of his official duties. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 603-101
(Smith-Hurd 1967). In New York the legislator is prohibited from soliciting or
receiving any gift greater than $25 in value under similar circumstances. N.Y.
PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972). See note 212 and accom-
panying text in!ra.
208. Comment, supra note 7, at 393.
209. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 602-101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973), prohibits
the member from paid lobbying but expressly permits him to lobby without com-
pensation. Other states, including Pennsylvania, have lobbyist registration acts which
establish disclosure requirements for lobbyists and those who hire them. See, e.g.,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 3372 (1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 148.1-.8 (1969). How-
ever, these provisions are not directed at the problem of paid lobbying by legislators
and have been found to be ineffective due to the lack of vigorous enforcement. See
Comment, supra note 7, at 394-97.
210. See note 205 supra.
211. See note 206 supra.
212. N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972), which provides
in pertinent part that no legislator shall receive a gift with a value greater than $25
"under circumstances in which it could reasonably be inferred that the gift was in-
tended to influence him, or could reasonably be expected to influence him, in the
performance of his official duties." Not only is this standard more objective and
thus easier to apply than that of section 5(a) of the Pennsylvania Code, but it also
protects the public's confidence in its legislature since it is aimed more at the appear-
ance of misconduct than any actual unethical behavior. See Legislative Code of
Ethics § 2(3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.2(3) (1969). Of course, this standard
could be used in conjunction with the subjective standard of section 5(a) so that
the receipt of gifts or compensation is proscribed where the recipient knows, or the
circumstances are such that he has reason to know that it was intended to influence him.
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With respect to the second part of section 5(a), the Pennsylvania
Code is more praiseworthy than the statutes of every state except Illinois
in its express prohibition of compensated lobbying. Although such activity
would be condemned under the more general prohibitions in the statutes
of other states, the express proscription of a member's receipt of com-
pensation for voting a particular way on legislation makes section 5(a)
more complete.
Finally, although section 5(a)'s prohibition is extensive, its effective-
ness would be increased by the inclusion of a sentence prohibiting "per-
sons" from giving, or offering to give, anything of value to a member
when his receipt thereof would be illegal. Such a prohibition is included
in the statutes of several other states, 2 1 and has the purpose of deterring
outsiders from attempting to "buy" a legislator's influence or services.
E. Confidential Information
A fifth conflict of interest principle is simply that "[p]ublic officials
should not be permitted to [disclose or] use for personal economic gain
confidential information acquired in their official capacities. ' 214 When a
public official violates this principle, there may be neither specific harm
to the government nor any injury to a particular private party. The evil
or wrong involved is the official's satisfaction of his personal interest
through the use of information which belongs to the government and
the general public.2 15 The official has exploited his public position to his
personal advantage.
Although it has been stated that "[t]his conflict of interest is so
obvious that any specific legislation would seem almost unnecessary,
216
the Pennsylvania general assembly apparently was extremely concerned
about the confidential information situation for it included five provisions
in the Code which are directly applicable to the problem. In the standards
of conduct section, there are two confidential information provisions:
section 4(2) which forbids disclosure or use to further the member's
personal interests, 217 and section 4(1) which proscribes acceptance of
employment which would require such disclosure. 218 Among the criminal
prohibitions, section 5(f) prohibits use of the information by the public
officer 2 10 and section 5(g) prohibits disclosure of such information to
others. 220 The only possible significant difference between sections 4(2)
and 5(f) is that the former proscribes a member's use of the in-
213. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268A, § 4(b) (1970); N.Y. PUB.
OFFICERS LAW § 73(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
214. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1121-22 (emphasis omitted).
215. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1122.
216. Note, supra note 64, at 686.
217. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.4(2) (1969). The full text of the Legislative
Code of Ethics is set forth in an appendix to this Comment.
218. Id. § 143.4(1).
219. Id. § 143.5(f).
220. Id. § 143.5(g).
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formation "to further his personal interests" while the latter provision
forbids such use "for private gain."'221 There would appear to be no real
difference between the two phrases, except that the latter phrase may
more clearly connote the pecuniary or economic interests of the member.
With respect to section 4(2) and section 5(g), the difference in
terminology may be more significant in that the former provision speaks
in terms of improper disclosure, while the latter provides that no confi-
dential information "shall be disclosed by a member to others for pur-
poses of their use for private gain, in circumstances where the use of
such information by the member would violate" section 5(f). 222 Thus,
mere disclosure is not sufficient to violate section 5(g). However, this
section is open to four possible readings. First, it could mean that the
member must disclose the information with the intent that the outsider
use it for private gain, and the outsider must actually use it in such a way
that he would thereby violate section 5(f) if he were a legislator; i.e.,
he must actually use it for private gain. Second, section 5(g) might
require only that the member disclose information with the intent that
the outsider use it for private gain, and the information be such that its
use by the member under those circumstances would violate section
5(f). Third, section 5(g) might mean that the "persons" to whom the
information is disclosed must use the information for private gain and
that their use must be such that a legislator so using it would violate
section 5(f). However, such a reading would render section 5(g)
internally redundant by including two identical requirements that the
recipient of the information use it for private gain. The final possibility
is that not only must the outsider actually use the information for his
private gain, but also the member's disclosure must be for the member's
private gain.223 Of these alternative readings, the first or second appears
the most correct.
The fifth provision of the Code applicable to the confidential informa-
tion problem is section 5(b). 224 This section prohibits certain forms of
disclosure only where the member receives "compensation or anything of
economic value" for any consultations based upon or relating to specified
information.225 None of the other provisions of the Code require the
receipt of compensation, except perhaps section 5(g) under the fourth
possible interpretation of that section suggested above.
221. Id. §§ 143.4(2), 5(f). Another difference between the two sections is that
section 4(2) speaks in terms of "confidential information required by him in the
course of his official duties," and section 5(f) of "any information not available to the
public at large and acquired by him solely by virtue of his position." Id. Thedifference, however, is insignificant; information not available to the public at large
is merely a definition of confidential information.
222. Id. § 143.5(g).
223. This latter requirement that the disclosure must be for the private gain of the
disclosing member would be similar to the requirement of section 5(b) that the dis-
closure of the information must be compensated or in exchange for something of
economic value. Id. § 143.5(b).
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Section 5(b) (2) forbids the compensated disclosure of information
which "is devoted substantially to the responsibilities, programs, or opera-
tions of the General Assembly. '226 The purpose of this provision is to
prevent divulgence of the workings of the state legislature and it covers
information readily available only to members. Thus, section 5(b) (1)
merely prohibits the most probable violations of the confidential informa-
tion principle with respect to legislators, although it is not absolutely
clear that the information disclosed must necessarily be confidential.
While section 5(b) (2) may be nothing more than a prohibition of the com-
pensated disclosure of confidential information, with "official data or
ideas which have not become part of the body of public information
'227
being merely another definition of confidential information, the section
probably deserves a broader reading. Since the prohibition covers con-
sultation which "draws substantially upon" such information, 228 it would
apparently proscribe consultation which is merely based on confidential
information, even though no such information is itself disclosed. 229 Such
compensated consultation would in effect be a use of such information by
the legislator for private gain and would seem to come within the pro-
hibition of section 5(f) as well as that of section 5(b).
Since compensation, or the receipt of anything of economic value,
is an element of the offense established by section 5(b), the exceptions
contained in sections 5(e)(1), (3), and (5)230 would apparently apply.
Thus, if the member's compensation for his consultation consisted of
reimbursement for travel expenses, a public award, or a campaign con-
tribution, the legislator would be exempt from section 5(b) prohibitions.
Further, the exceptions inherent in the definition of a "thing of economic
value" would be applicable to a section 5(b) case. 231
It is apparent from the above discussion that the approach taken
by the Pennsylvania Code to the problem of confidential information is
quite confusing, duplicative, and gives little concrete guidance to legis-
lators as to what is proper conduct. In other states, the use of confidential
information by a state legislator for his personal gain or economic
advantage and his disclosure of such information to other persons is
almost universally condemned. 23 2  Section 5(g) of the Pennsylvania
226. Id. § 143.5(b)(2).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. An example would be a situation in which there is confidential information
within the legislator's knowledge that a state highway is to be built with the resultant
condemnation of land in a given area. The member could consult with an outsider
for compensation and advise him to purchase land in the area without telling the
outsider of the proposed highway. The consultation would draw upon or be based
upon the confidential information though none would actually be disclosed.
230. Id. §§ 143.4(e) (1), (3), (5). See notes 195-201 and accompanying text supra.
231. Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(11), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(11)
(1969). See notes 195-201 and accompanying text supra.
232. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1291(3) (Supp. 1971); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 8920(b) (2) (West Supp. 1973) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(5) (1973); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 603-104 (Smith-Hurd 1967); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
42:1143(B) (1965); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 23(c) (1970); N.Y.
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Code might be different from the disclosure prohibitions in other states
since that section, although ambiguous, may require the recipient to make
some use of the confidential information. In other states the member's
disclosure alone is forbidden. However, the statutes of several states go
beyond a mere use/disclosure prohibition and provide, similarly to section
4(1) of the Pennsylvania Code, that no member shall accept any outside
employment or engage in any business which would or might require him
to disclose information not available to the public at large.233  Only
Louisiana has a prohibition similar to section 5(b) of the Code. 23 4 It
is submitted that the general assembly should prohibit the simple dis-
closure of confidential information and its use for private gain and retain
present section 4(1) with respect to outside employment in a general
code of ethics. 235 Such an approach would be in line with the statutes of
other states and would adequately cover the problem.
F. Extra-Legislative Employment
The dangers sought to be averted in the extra-legislative employ-
ment situation are improper influence of the member's performance of
official responsibilities and impairment of his independence of judgment
with respect to public matters. The principle is broad - the legislator
should not accept employment with, or render services to, private in-
terests that are incompatible with his public duties and responsibilities. 23 6
However, the problem of making the cost of governmental employment
Pun. OFFICERS LAW § 74(3) (c) (McKinney Supp. 1972); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-9, § 4(f) (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.22.040(6)
(1972). Most of the prohibitions are phrased in almost the same language as the
general principles stated in the text, see text accompanying note 214 supra, although
there is some variation with respect to whether the prohibition is of use for economic
gain, for furtherance of personal interests, or for the legislator's own advantage
or benefit.
In the Arizona and California statutes, however, there is the added require-
ment that the disclosure of the inside information be knowing and willful, apparently
because these states rely upon criminal sanctions.
In Louisiana, the statutory prohibition is totally different from all other
states, except Pennsylvania, providing that no member shall receive compensation
for any consultation the subject matter of which involves matters or operations of
the state legislature or draws substantially upon confidential information. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 42:1143(B) (1965).
233. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1291(2) (Supp. 1971-72); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 8920(b)(1) (West Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.313(4) (1973); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 23(b) (1970); N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 74(3) (b)
(McKinney Supp. 1972); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9.4(g) (Supp.
1972) ; WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.22.040(5) (1972). All of these statutes, except
those in New York and Massachusetts, proscribe acceptance of employment which
would reasonably be expected to require, or which the member has reason to believe
would require, disclosure. New York and Massachusetts merely forbid employment
which would require disclosure.
234. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1143(B) (1965).
235. But see Comment, supra note 7, at 389, wherein it is asserted that the em-
ployment restriction adds little if anything to the basic use/disclosure prohibition.
236. This principle would cover some of the situations previously discussed,
particularly the situation dealing with assistance to outsiders. See notes 152-86 and
accompanying text supra. However, the extra-legislative employment principle is
much broader than the specific situations previously discussed.
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prohibitive arises in this situation, and again a balance must be struck
between the dual objectives of conflicts of interest legislation.23 7
Apparently sensitive to this problem, the legislatures of the states
which have dealt with the extra-legislative employment situation have
couched their restrictions in general terms. Some statutes merely pro-
hibit a legislator from using or attempting to use his public office to secure
unwarranted privileges,238 a provision which would apply to almost every
conflicts situation. More specific are those provisions which forbid the
use of the legislator's office to engage 'in transactions which conflict with
the proper performance of the member's public duties.23 9 Several state
statutes also provide that no legislator shall accept other employment which
will impair his independence of judgment in relation to public matters.24
The only provisions of the Pennsylvania Code applicable to this
situation are section 4(3), which prohibits the use of official position "to
secure unwarranted privileges '2 41 and section 4(1), which forbids the
acceptance of outside employment which will require the divulgence of
confidential information.2 42 Because the former provision is so broad and
gives no real guidance with respect to extra-legislative employment and
since the latter provision is more specifically directed at confidential in-
formation, it is submitted that the general assembly should add a pro-
hibition which states the general principle and provides that no legislator
should accept employment which will impair his independence of judgment
in legislative matters. Such a prohibition would be quite general, but
could be appropriately included among the section 4 standards of conduct.
G. Post-Legislative Service
The principle underlying post-legislative service restrictions is that
"[f]ormer public officials should not, within certain narrow limits of
time and degree of connection with their former responsibilities, be
allowed to assist private entities or persons in their dealings with govern-
ment. '243 This principle could be stated more broadly to proscribe any
post-employment activities of the member which directly involve the
government or might require the legislator to use his governmental in-
237. Comment, supra note 7, at 379.
238. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(3) (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 268A, § 23(d) (1970) ; N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 74(3) (d) (McKinney Supp.
1972); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9, § 4(d) (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.22.040 (1972).
239. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1291(1) (Supp. 1971); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 8920(a) (West Supp. 1973) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.88(1) (b) (1967);
N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW §§ 74(2), (3) (e) (McKinney Supp. 1972) ; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.22.030 (1972).
240. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1291(2) (Supp. 1971); CAL. GO'T
CODE § 8920(b)(1) (West Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(6) (1973);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 603-201 (Smith-Hurd 1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 268A, § 23(a) (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.88(1) (a) (1967); N.Y. PUB.
OFFICES LAW § 74(3) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
241. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.4(3) (1969).
242. Id. § 143.4(1).
243. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1121.
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fluence. The restrictions imposed are intended to supplement those govern-
ing the activities of the member during his term and seek to prevent the
ex-legislator from using influence derived from his contacts and associa-
tions, or confidential information acquired during his term, for his per-
sonal gain or for the benefit of others.244 Again, the need to balance the
dual objectives of conflicts of interest legislation is obvious because the
insecurity of legislative service usually means that the member may return
to a private job at the end of his term. At least one commentator has
suggested that any post-legislative employment retrictions are of doubtful
advisability and create an unreasonable deterrent to public service.
245
Few state statutes include provisions restricting the post-legislative
activities of their state legislators. In Massachusetts, a former govern-
ment employee is barred for life from acting as an agent or attorney and
from receiving compensation in relation to any particular matter in which
he participated as a government employee and in which the state is a party
or has a direct and substantial interest. 246 In addition, Massachusetts
bans, for one year, the former employee from appearing on behalf of
another person before any state court or agency with respect to any
matter in which the state is a party or has a direct and substantial interest,
provided the matter was within the ex-employee's official responsibility
within two years before the termination of his public employment. 24
New York on the other hand, merely prohibits a former legislator from
accepting compensation for lobbying before either house within two years
after the end of his term.248 While Mississippi prohibits a state legislator
from having an interest in a state contract made within one year of the
end of his term.
249
There is no provision in the Pennsylvania Code which is directed
at restricting the actvities of the former legislator.2 50 Accordingly, it
244. Perkins, supra note 7, at 1121; Comment, supra note 7, at 383-84; Note,
supra note 64, at 682-83.
245. Comment, supra note 7, at 385.
246. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 5(a) (1970).
247. Id. § 5(b). Sections 5(c) and (d) of the Massachusetts statute impose
restrictions similar to those of sections 5(a) and (b) on partners of former public
servants. Id. §§ 5(c), (d). The federal conflicts of interest act is similar to the
Massachusetts statute with respect to post-governmental activities restrictions, 18
U.S.C. § 207 (1970), except that the Massachusetts act expressly provides that a
state legislator is not precluded from acting as a private legislative counsel or agent
any time after his term. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 5 (1970).
248. N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(7) (McKinney Supp. 1972). Although on
its face this provision would appear much narrower than the prohibitions in the
Massachusetts statute, the effect of the New York provision on the state legislators
may actually be more restrictive. The Massachusetts act applies to public officials
and employees generally, and with respect to legislators it prohibits only activity
for private parties with respect to legislative matters, since the former legislator
would probably have participated in or had responsibility over only such matters.
The Massachusetts act does not prohibit compensated lobbying by the ex-legislator
because the definition of "particular matter" excludes the enactment of general legis-
lation. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § l(k) (1970).
249. MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 109; MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 2301, 2302 (1957).
250. All of the prohibitions of section 5 of the Code speak in terms of members,
which, as defined, does not include former legislators. See Legislative Code of
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would be appropriate for the general assembly to amend the Code to in-
clude a provision prohibiting a former member, for a one or two year
period, from receiving compensation for assisting a private "person" with
respect to matters which were before the general assembly during the
member's term. The Code should, at least, include a one or two year
ban on compensated lobbying by the former legislator.2 51 A broader re-
striction would have little more applicability,252 and the narrow restrictions
suggested would eliminate the most obvious possibilities for abuse with-
out absolutely prohibiting post-term activity or making the cost of legis-
lative service unduly restrictive.
253
IV. PENALITIES, REMEDIES, DISCLOSURE AND ENFORCEMENT
A. Penalties and Remedies
The Pennsylvania Legislative Code of Ethics relies heavily upon
criminal sanctions for the enforcement of its provisions. Section 6(a)
provides that a violation of section 5 is a misdemeanor for which a legis-
lator may be fined not more than $1000 plus costs and, upon default in
payment of any fine imposed, imprisoned for up to two years.25 4 Since
violation of section 5 constitutes a misdemeanor, a violating legislator
would also be required to forfeit his office as a result of conviction.2 55
Section 7 of the Code provides for civil remedies, which supplement
the criminal sanctions available for violations of section 5, and provide the
sole remedies for violations of section 4. These remedies were appar-
ently added with the assumption that the imposition of criminal sanctions
is not a totally effective or satisfactory means of furthering the purposes
of the act.256 Although a few other states provide for civil remedies in
Ethics § 3(6), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(6) (1969). See note 20 supra.
However, the general prohibition of section 4(3) might have some applicability in
this situation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.4(3) (1969).
251. But see Comment, supra note 7, at 385; text accompaning note 141 supra.
The problems of determining when the legislator's employment ended and when the
matter was before the legislature would not arise as they do with respect to other
government officials and employees because of the legislator's fixed term and the
general assembly's determinate sessions. See Buss, supra note 5, at 347-48.
252. See note 248 supra.
253. See Note, supra note 64, at 683.
254. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.6(a) (1969). Section 6(b) provides that
any fine imposed under section 6(a) shall be paid into the state's general fund. Id.
§ 143.6(b). Section 6(a) may be of doubtful constitutionality, at least in certain
situations, for if it could be shown that a legislator convicted for violating section 5
was unable to pay the fine imposed because he lacked the necessary funds, imprison-
ment of the member for such a default would be violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). If
the member merely refused or neglected to pay the fine, the equal protection clause
would not bar his incarceration.
255. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 121 (Supp. 1973) provides, in effect, that a public
officer who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is convicted in a court of record for
any misdemeanor in office shall forfeit his office and the sentence imposed shall
include a direction of removal from office.
256. Cf. Buss, supra note 5, at 382.
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their conflicts legislation, 257 Massachusetts is the only state which ex-
pressly provides for civil remedies as extensive as those contained in
section 7 of the Pennsylvania Code.
2 5 s
Section 7(a) authorizes any agency head 25 9 who has the final authority
to approve or execute a state contract to cancel or rescind any such con-
tract "without further liability to the Commonwealth where he finds that
a violation of this act has influenced the making of said contract. '260 The
finding that the contract was tainted must be made in accordance with the
Pennsylvania "Administrative Agency Law' 261 and is subject to judicial
review,262 thus protecting the private contractor from an attempt to use
section 7(a) as a means of evading a burdensome contract. Moreover, an
action for rescission or cancellation may not be initiated until the appropri-
ate house or senate ethics committee finds that a violation has occurred.
2 63
This requirement greatly reduces the effectiveness of the rescission remedy
because the history of the legislative ethics committees in Pennsylvania
has been one of inaction.
264
The final condition attached to the section 7(a) remedy is that "such
rescission shall be limited so as not to affect adversely the interests of
innocent third parties. '26 5 This proviso means that the right to rescind
should not be exercised to the detriment of innocent private contractors
or other outsiders affected by the contract. Also, it apparently allows
partial rescission of the contract and might authorize the repayment of
money or return of property to the private contractor.2 66
In addition to the rescission remedy provided in section 7(a), section
7 (c) authorizes the attorney general to bring a civil action on behalf of
257. The Florida, New Jersey, and New York statutes provide that a violation
of the statutory prohibitions or standards is grounds for suspension, dismissal, or
removal from office, while Texas authorizes the cancellation of any contract or other
arrangement binding on the state which was made through a violation of the statute.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.317 (1973); N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:13D-23(d) (Supp. 1973);
N.Y. Pun. OFFICERS LAW § 74(4) (McKinney Supp. 1972); TEX. REv. CIv STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-9, § 7 (Supp. 1972).
258. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 9 (1970) provides for cancellation
or rescission of contracts tainted by a violation of the act, and recovery by the state
of damages equal to the amount of economic advantage obtained by the public official
through violation of the act or $500, whichever is greater.
259. See Legislative Code of Ethics § 3(2), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.3(2)
(1969).
260. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 46, § 143.7(a) (1969).
261. Id. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1 et seq. (1962).
262. Legislative Code of Ethics § 7(b), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.7(b) (1969).
The agency head is empowered to suspend the contract pending judicial review of
his determination.
263. Legislative Code of Ethics § 7(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 14 3.7(a) (1969).
264. Legislative ethics committees have generally proved to be ineffective vehicles
for policing legislative conduct. Unfortunately this also has been the case in
Pennsylvania. See notes 308-12 and accompanying text infra.
265. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.7(a) (1969).
266. See, Buss, supra note 5, at 383. The earlier provision in section 7(a) to
the effect that the rescission or cancellation may be without further liability to the
state might be read as foreclosing any monetary repayment or property return, but
the section uses the word "may," indicating that the agency head has the discretion
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the state against a legislator who has violated the Code to recover the
amount of any economic advantage gained.
26 7
By authorizing restitution to the state for the amount of "economic
advantage" gained, the problem of determining the actual damages caused by
the violation is avoided. It should be noted that the unwarranted economic
gain is recoverable only by the state, regardless of any losses that might
have been suffered by private parties. 2 8 It is submitted, however, that if
the legislature desires a strictly enforced code of ethics, some thought
should be given to the merits of creating a private cause of action analogous
to section 7(c), allowing private parties to sue for damages suffered
steming from the Code violation, or, at the least, to interplead for the
sums recovered by the state when actual damages are proved. Providing
the impetus of private enforcement to the Code would restore some of
the vitality previously lost because of the inhibitions to intramural enforce-
ment,2° 9 and would appropriately render the lawmaker liable to private
parties when he has breached their trust. Spurious, harassing claims
against legislators would be minimal if - as under 7(c) and 7(b) - the
civil action could not be initiated without an affimative finding of wrong-
doing by the appropriate legislative ethics committee.
Finally, section 7(e) authorizes the legislator who was responsible
for hiring a legislative employee to dismiss, suspend, or take other appro-
priate action upon a finding that the employee has violated the Code.
270
Such action may be taken by the legislator upon his own finding of mis-
conduct, and must be taken if ordered by the appropriate ethics com-
mittee upon its finding of a violation.27' Nothing in this section or any
other provision of the Code provides for the disqualification or removal
of a legislator, as opposed to a legislative employee, but, under another
statute, a legislator is subject to forfeiture of office upon conviction for
violation of section 5.272 Since section 7(e) is to be enforced by individual
legislators and the legislative ethics committees, the problem of intra-
mural enforcement plagues the provision as it does other parts of section 7.
B. Disclosure
Disclosure requirements are essentially preventative measures. 27 8
The information disclosed provides a useful enforcement tool since it
267. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.7(c) (1969). As under section 7(a), however,
the attorney general cannot bring an action under section 7(c) until an affirmative
finding of a violation of the Code has been made by the appropriate legislative ethics
committee. Id. Also, the civil action must be brought within two years of the
discovery of the occurrence of the alleged violation or within four years after the
actual occurrence of the misconduct, whichever period is shorter. Id. § 143.7(d).
268. See Buss, supra note 5, at 383-84.
269. See notes 308-11 and accompanying text infra.
270. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.7(e) (1969).
271. Id.
272. Id. tit. 65, § 121 (Supp. 1973). Violation of the Code would also be grounds
for impeachment of the legislator. PA. CONST. art. 6, § 6.
273. Case, The Congress and its Double Standard, 24 FED. B.J. 257, 260 (1964).
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gives the enforcement agencies a list of the legislator's possibly conflicting
interests.2 7 4 Theoretically, disclosure also reduces the possibility of a
member's exploitation of his position or use of his influence, since it may
be presumed that the legislator will be deterred from acting in his own
interest if the agencies with which he deals, as well as the public, are aware
of his potentially conflicting interests. 27 5 Finally, full public disclosure
serves to increase the apparent integrity of government and to maintain
the public's confidence in its elected officials by affording the public the
opportunity to more effectively evaluate the conduct of the legislators
and by dispelling the impression that decisions of governmental bodies
are rigged or influenced. 276 Of course, the need to balance the dual objec-
tives of conflicts regulation is present since a requirement that the legis-
lator disclose his personal interests tends to infringe upon the privacy
of the member.277 However, this invasion is justified to the extent that
taking public office of necessity results in some expected loss of privacy,
and because the alternative - divestment - would make the cost of
public service much more prohibitive.
2 78
The Legislative Code of Ethics makes disclosure a condition prece-
dent to the undertaking of certain conduct. In this way the requirement
demands affirmative action and is violated by the member's failure to
make the required disclosure. The narrow requirement of section 5(d)
provides for disclosure by the member to the house clerk or senate secre-
tary of all compensated assistance to outsiders in "transactions involving
the Commonwealth.1 279  Under this section, the member must file a
written statement containing: (1) his name and address; (2) the name
and address of the "person" assisted or to be assisted; and (3) "whether
the amount of compensation for services rendered or to be rendered is
(i) one thousand dollars ($1000), or more, or (ii) less than one thousand
274. See, Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 6, at 285; Note, supra note 66, at 1230.
This discussion will be limited to disclosure by legislators while in office and will not
involve an examination of the disclosure requirements often imposed upon candidates
for legislative office.
275. See, Note, supra note 64, at 682.
276. See, Case, supra note 273, at 261; Note, supra note 5, at 461. With respect
to congressional disclosure requirements, Krasnow & Lankford made the following
observation which is equally applicable at the state level:
Public disclosure, as long as the extent of reporting required is sufficiently
extensive to cover those circumstances from which a conflict of interest might
be inferred, is an important step in fostering public confidence in the integrity
of Congress as an institution. This remedy avoids the extreme solution of
outlawing all outside sources of income, dealings in stock, and receipt of fees for
any reason.
Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 6, at 284.
277. For extensive analyses of disclosure, invasion of privacy, and the constitutional
problems created thereby, see Comment, Public Officials: The Constitutional Implica-
tions of Mandatory Public Financial Disclosure Statutes, and a Proposal for Change,
1971 L. & Soc. ORDER 104; Comment, Financial Disclosure by Public Officials and
Public Employees in Light of Counsel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 534
(1971).
278. See Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 6, at 284; Comment, supra note 6,
at 400.
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dollars ($1000) ;" and (4) a description of the transaction and nature of
the member's services. 2 80 The disclosure statement to the clerk or secre-
tary is then "deemed confidential and privileged" unless a public hearing is
convened for the purpose of investigating an alleged violation.
281
The statement must be filed within 10 days of the member's receipt
or entry into an agreement to receive compensation. 28 2 Since the language
is disjunctive, it could be interpreted as affording the legislator the alter-
native of filing within 10 days of entering into a compensation agreement
or disclosing within 10 days of the date the compensation is actually
received pursuant to the agreement, a time which could be long after the
rendering of the assistance. To prevent such an interpretation, the general
assembly should amend section 5(d) to provide that the filing must be
within 10 days of the date of compensation or agreement, whichever
comes first.
It has been asserted, with respect to provisions similar to section
5(d), that the requirement that the statement filed be kept confidential
and made public only in connection with a public hearing for a violation
of the Code2 83 strikes an appropriate balance by protecting the public from
misconduct without unnecessarily invading the privacy of the legislator.
28 4
However, it is submitted that this approach undercuts one of the basic
rationales of the disclosure requirement: that the legislators will think
twice before entering into conflict situations when exposed to the glare
of public scrutiny.285 At the least, the statement should be given to any
state agency or official involved in the state transaction with respect to
which the member's assistance is afforded.2 6
Although it is widely acknowledged that disclosure in some form is
necessary for truly effective conflict of interest legislation, 28 7 there is con-
siderable variance among the states as to the appropriate type of require-
ment. The most common provision requires that if a legislator, or a member
of his immediate family, is an officer, director, agent, or salaried employee
280. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(d) (1969). If the member in question is a
representative or house employee, he must file the statement with the chief clerk of the




284. See Note, supra note 151, at 457.
285. See note 275 and accompanying text supra. A former official of the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board has recommended that administrative operAtions be
made public, stating:
If no secrets as to special requests and/or treatment are kept from the public,
then the public would become more reassured of the impartiality of board
decisions, and people would have second thoughts before asking for any special
treatment.
Philadelphia Inquirer, supra note 174, at 2, col. 2.
286. A bill has been proposed by Representative William H. Yohn, the present
chairman of the House Ethics Committee, that would require a more particular
financial disclosure by members available for public inspection. H.B. No. 1306
General Assembly of Pennsylvania (1973 Sess.). See also Philadelphia Evening
Bulletin, Aug. 3, 1973, § 1, at 3, col. 6. See note 174 and accompanying text supra,
287. Note, supra note 5, at 461.
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of, or owns a substantial interest in, any business entity subject to state
regulation, he must file a statement disclosing the nature and extent of
such relationship or interest. 28 8 In addition, the New York act requires
disclosure, in the member's discretion, of all other possibly conflicting
interests, 2 9 and the Texas statute provides that every member with a
certain salary must annually disclose all sources of income, acquisitions,
and investments of both himself and his spouse.2 90 A few other states
impose significantly broader disclosure requirements. Arizona requires
the disclosure of all offices and directorships held by a member in any
business organized for the purpose of making a profit, regardless of
whether the business entity in which the positions are held is subject to state
regulation or doing business with the state.291 Illinois mandates disclosure,
subject to de minimis exceptions, of, inter alia: (1) the member's private
professional practice, if any; (2) the recipient of professional services
rendered by the legislator; (3) the name of any entity transferring a gift
to the legislator; (4) the identity of any capital asset from which he has
realized a capital gain in the preceding year; and (5) the nature and
amount of any ownership interest in an entity doing business in that
state.292  Some states have more narrow provisions which require dis-
closure of: (1) any personal interest in a matter in which the legislator
participates as a public official ;293 (2) all business transactions with the
state by the member or a "person" in which he holds an interest ;24 or
(3) all compensated assistance or appearances with respect to matters
before state agencies or in which the state has an interest.
2 5
It is submitted that the general assembly should amend the Code to
include a provision similar to that employed by most other states, requiring
diclosure of all relationships and interests of the member and his family
in entities subject to state regulation. Moreover, the Pennsylvania legis-
lature would do well to go further and mandate disclosure of all financial
288. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(2) (1973) ; N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW
§ 73(6) (a) (1) (McKinney Supp. 1972) ; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9,
§ 4(e) (Supp. 1972) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-358(d) (ii) (1973) ; WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 42.22.050 (1972). Under all the provisions cited, the disclosure must be
annual, and, except in Washington, the statement filed is open to public inspection.
289. In New York, the legislator must disclose any interest which he determines
might reasonably be affected by legislative action or which should be disclosed
in the public interest. N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(6) (a) (3) (McKinney Supp.
1972).
290. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9, § 4(o) (Supp. 1972). Only those
members with salaries in excess of $11,000 are covered. Id.
291. Inexplicably, however, the Arizona statute does not cover other sources of
income as proprietary interests. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1295(A) (1) (Supp.
1971).
292. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
293. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8920(b) (5) (West Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 268A, § 6 (1970) ; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9, § 4(f) (Supp.
1972).
294. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-18 (Supp. 1973).
295. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1295(A) (2) (Supp. 1971); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1143(D) (1965). The Louisiana disclosure requirement is
almost identical to that contained in the Pennsylvania Code. See Legislative Code of
Ethics § 5(d), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.5(d) (1969).
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interests of the solon, with perhaps a minimum dollar limit.2 96 These
statements should be filed annually and be open to public inspection. In
addition, the present section 5(d) should be retained to cover certain
aspects of the outside assistance situation.
297
In order to make the disclosure requirements fully effective, the
Pennsylvania legislature should also enact a provision prohibiting false
disclosure statements, such as that contained in the New York Act.
2 9 8
It should be noted, however, that such a prohibition could be read into the
disclosure requirements themselves by the Pennsylvania courts on the
theory "that the obligation to file truthful statements is implicit in the
obligation to file,"'29 and because false filings undermine the purpose of
the disclosure mandate and are often more harmful than no filing at all.
However, such judicial construction might well encroach upon the legis-
lative function and it is questionable whether the Pennsylvania courts
would be willing to do so. Accordingly, an express statutory prohibition
would appear to be appropriate.
C. Enforcement
The Legislative Code of Ethics does not provide for an enforcing
mechanism to give meaning to its sanctions and standards, but assumes
the formation of house and senate ethics committees. This assumption is
apparent in section 7, which requires an affirmative finding by the "appro-
priate House or Senate Committee on Ethics" before either the section
7(a) contract rescission or section 7(c) civil action provisions may be
implemented. 80 0 However, neither the section 4 standards of conduct,
nor the section 5 prohibitions and disclosure requirements make mention
of an authorized role for an enforcing committee. Furthermore, no
authority is granted the committees to issue advisory opinions, hold hear-
ings, or initiate investigations. As a result of this initial failure to
provide for a viable enforcing mechanism, and the apparent subsequent
legislative indifference, the Code has remained generally ineffective in
promoting legislative right conduct and public confidence in government.80'
Instead, the history of the Code seems unfortunately to have made a
prophet of one perceptive commentator who, writing in 1959, stated:
[N]ot the least danger of the promulgation of a code of ethics
is that the act of promulgation itself may tend to be looked upon by
the responsible government as a panacea for conflict-of-interests
problems, or may operate as a single symbolic gesture by which that
government effectively washes its hands of the affair. Codes, how-
296. See recommended disclosure requirements, Comment, supra note 7, at 400.
297. See note 186 and accompanying text supra.
298. N.Y. PuB. OFFICERS LAW § 73(6) (C) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
299. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 710 (citation omitted) (emphasis
in original) (2d Cir. 1971), noted in 17 VILL. L. REV. 734 (1972).
300. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 143.7(c) (1969).
301. See Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, supra note 286, at 3, col. 6.
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ever, will be effective only insofar as they are elucidated, adminis-
tered, enforced.
802
To date, a senate ethics committee has never been formed. The house
committee has almost matched this level of inactivity by holding no regular
meetings, receiving no funding, and conducting only one investigation
of a member in its history - and then only at the legislator's request. 0 3
In providing, albeit obtusely, for intramural enforcement, Pennsyl-
vania conforms with the vast majority of other states which place en-
forcement of their statutory conflicts of interest provisions in the hands
of either an ethics committee in each house of the state legislature 0 4 or a
joint legislative committee. 0 5 Only a few states provide for non-legis-
lators on the committees,30 6 and of those, only three have established
completely independent committees.3 0 7 This is despite the fact that com-
mentators almost universally condemn entrusting of the policing respon-
sibilities to legislator dominated bodies.303 Application and interpretation
of the statutory mandates is a difficult and politically sensitive task, and
the legislators themselves may either be tempted to exploit conflicts of
their fellow members' interest for political gain or, because "[t]here
is a rule of the [legislative] fraternity that no member shall expose
publicly the transgressions of another," 30 9 may tend to be lax in enforce-
ing the statutory prohibitions. This phenomenon has been termed the
302. Note, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 985, 1025-26 (1959).
303. Interview with Representative Frederick Schupnik, Chairman of the Penn-
sylvania House of Representatives Ethics Committee, in Harrisburg, Pa., Mar. 14,
1972. See Bulletin, supra note 286, at 3, col. 8.
304. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.318(1) (1973) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.89
(1967) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.60.020 (1970).
305. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE § 8940 (West Supp. 1973) (three members from
each house) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 606-101 (Smith-Hurd 1967) (two members
from each house) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-22 (Supp. 1973) (four members from
each house).
306. The Washington statute creates an eight man ethics committee for each
house with four members who are not active legislators. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 44.060.020 (1970). In Texas, the code of ethics is enforced by an ethics commission
comprised of three members of the house, three senators, and six other members,
appointed two each by the chief justice of the state supreme court, the president
judge of the court of criminal appeals, and the chairman of the state judicial
qualifications committee. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9, § 8 (a) (Supp.
1972).
307. Louisiana provides for a three member board of ethics for state elected
officials; the governor appoints one member and each house elects one member,
none of whom may be a member of that body. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1144(A)
(1965). Hawaii utilizes a state ethics commission, composed of five persons appointed
by the governor from a list of ten candidates nominated by the state judicial council.
These members may not hold any other public office. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 84-21
(Supp. 1972). The Kansas committee on governmental ethics consists of five
members, none of whom may otherwise be in the public employ. Two members are
appointed by the governor, and one each by the chief justice of the supreme court,
the house speaker, and the senate president. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4303(a) (Supp.
1972).
308. See Rhodes, Enforcement of Legislative Ethics: Conflict Within the Conflict
of Interest Laws, 10 HARV. J. LEGIs. 373 (1973). See also Note, supra note 9, at
1231 ; Note, supra note 8, at 453.
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"conflict within the conflict of interest laws" and derives from the
",cjonformance to group-sanctioned standards which encourage civility,
mutual assistance, cohesion, and institutional chauvinism" characteristic of
legislative bodies.310
Because of this general inability or unwillingness of legislatures to
police themselves, most commentators agree that a special governmental
agency or ethics commission should be established and put beyond legisla-
tive control with non-partisan, non-representative appointed members ;311
"optionally [enforcementj should be entrusted to a broadly-based, in-
dependent body in order to promote public confidence in investigative
impartiality and forestall suspicion that a violation has been 'white-
washed.' ",312
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania general assembly should create
such a body to interpret and apply the Legislative Code of Ethics. Such
an independent ethics commission could, at the least, be delegated the
duties presently assigned to the house and senate committees of ethics. It
would then be responsible for determining the occurrence of a violation, a
necessary prerequisite for both the cancellation or rescission of a tainted
contract under section 7(a) and the bringing of a civil action for restitu-
tion under section 7(c). Such a commission could be given the authority
now delegated to agency heads to cancel and rescind contracts, and the
power presently left to the legislature, as a body, to dismiss, suspend, or
take other appropriate action with respect to members found in violation
of the Code. Finally, the commission could be delegated the responsibility
for administering the disclosure requirements of section 5(d). Placing
all these duties in the hands of a single independent body would not only
assure effective enforcement and promote public confidence, but would
also provide for a consolidation of functions and simplification of operation.
If such a commission is to be effective, it is submitted that the general
assembly must delineate, by statute, the necessary power and authority.
313
For example, the commission should be empowered to receive and in-
310. Rhodes, supra note 308, at 281-82.
311. In order to assure that the commission remains as independent as possible,
its members should not be appointed by only one person or body or even solely
by governmental bodies or officials. For some possible appointing bodies and officials,
see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9, § 8(a) (Supp. 1972) ; Comment, supra
note 7, at 373 n.31; Note, supra note 66, at 1213. For a contrary opinion proposing
a governor-elected commission, see Rhodes, supra note 308, at 396-99.
312. Comment, supra note 7, at 373. See Note, supra note 5, at 462-63; Note,
supra note 9, at 1231. The use of such an independent commission "would allow the
legislators themselves to set out the basic topics of concern, and the nonlegislators
to apply them flexibly and usefully, providing a clearer guide to behavior and a
deterrent to misbehavior." Note, supra note 9, at 1232. But see Krasnow & Lankford,
supra note 6, at 281-85, wherein the authors suggest that such a proposal would
not command enough support to be created at least on the federal level, and that a
joint house-senate ethics committee would be the most feasible alternative.
313. The statutes of several states may serve as a model. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 8940-8955 (West Supp. 1973), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1144 (1965) as
amended, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1144(E) (Supp. 1973); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 52:13D-
22 (Supp. 1973) ; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9, § 8 (Supp. 1972) ; WASHf.
REV. CODE ANN. § 44.60.060 (1970).
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vestigate complaints, as well as to investigate suspected misconduct on its
own initiative.314 The commission also should be authorized to hold hear-
ings, consonant with the due process rights of the accused, and to subpoena
witnesses and hear testimony.315 The commission might be given the
power to recommend the initiation of restitution actions, and to transmit
its findings to the attorney general or local district attorney's office with
recommendations for further investigation and possible prosecution .3 1
The provision of two additional grants of authority would further
aid an enforcing commission. First, the commission could be empowered
to issue advisory opinions, either on request of a member or on its own
initiative, which would constitute advice to a legislator with respect to
the propriety of conduct in particular situationsA1 7 The opinions should
be published, with the identity of the requesting member kept confiden-
tial, if necessary. The commission's findings and rulings made on com-
plaints of code violations should also be published, deleting the name of
any alleged violator exonerated of misconduct. These advisory opinions
and rulings would be a helpful source of guidance to the legislators deal-
ing with subtle conflicts problems and would probably replace adjudica-
tion as the primary source of interpretation of the statutory provisions.
If the commission had sufficient prestige, the mere publication of its rulings
might provide an adequate deterrent to legislative misconduct.A1'
Second, the commission could be authorized to conduct investiga-
tions or studies on its own initiative and to issue regulations supplement-
ing statutory provisions. The regulations should be given the force of
law, or, in the alternative, the commission could make recommendations
to the legislature for reformation or revision of the statute. With such
314. For a noteworthy proposal for an independent state legislative ethics com-
mission, see Rhodes, supra note 308, at 396-406. A small step in the right direction
is the resolution recently passed by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives
granting the house ethics committee authority to issue advisory opinions and initiate
investigations. H. Res. 104, General Assembly of Pennsylvania (1973 Sess.),
amending H. Rule 47. See Bulletin, supra note 286.
315. A private preliminary hearing could be held to determine the merit of the
charges before a public hearing is conducted. The private hearing would serve to
protect the alleged violator in the event that the complaint was found to be clearly
without merit. See Comment, supra note 7, at 373-74; Note, supra note 5, at 463-64;
Note, supra note 8, at 457.
316. See Comment, supra note 7, at 373-74; Note, supra note 5, at 463; Note,
supra note 8, at 457-58. By recommending further investigation and possible prose-
cution in certain cases, the commission would serve as an initial screening device,
assuring that the criminal law was invoked only when convictions were probable,
which is the situation in which criminal sanctions are most appropriate. Comment,
supra note 7, at 373.
317. Presently, several state statutes provide for the issuance of advisory opinions
either by the attorney general or by a legislative ethics committee. See, e.g., CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 8955 (West Supp. 1973) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1144(E) (7)
(Supp. 1973); N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:13D-22(g) (Supp. 1973). Of course, such
opinions would merely be legal advice and not authoritative or binding statutory
interpretations. Accordingly, the opinions would not be as reliable as judicial deter-
minations, but would probably be much more numerous and extensive and might give
direction to judicial determinations.
318. See Buss, supra note 5, at 382, 385-86. Comment, supra note 7, at 375; Note,
supra note 5, at 463; Note, supra note 9, at 1231-32; Note, supra note 8, at 457-58.
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power, the commission would provide the impetus for continuing reform
of Pennsylvania's legislative conflicts of interest law. 19
V. CONCLUSION
In enacting the Legislative Code of Ethics, the Pennsylvania general
assembly has followed the lead of several other states in adopting a statu-
tory approach to the problem of legislative conflicts of interests. As would
be expected, there are many weaknesses in the Code, the most important
being the lack of a comprehensive contract prohibition, the failure to
provide a more complete section on standards of conduct, and the en-
trusting of much of the enforcement responsibility to largely fictional legis-
lative ethics committees rather than an independent ethics commission.
The Code also contains the usual amount of ambiguity and confusion.
However, there are also several strong points in the Code. First, the
general assembly has attacked the legislative conflicts problem directly
with a statute which applies solely to legislators and legislative employees.
Further, the substantive provisions, particularly the self-dealing pro-
hibition of section 5(c), are outstanding in parts, and, through the express
exceptions of section 5(e), generally strike an appropriate balance between
the dual objectives of conflicts legislation. Finally, the civil remedies con-
tained in section 7 are substantial and more extensive than those of most
other states. On the whole, the general assembly has made a commendable
effort in enacting the Code, which, with vigorous enforcement, could go a
considerable distance toward the goal of controlling legislative conflicts.t
James A. Shellenberger*
Richard B. Hardt
319. See Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 6, at 280-85; Note, supra note 9, at 1231-
32. Krasnow and Lankford propose that a federal commission or legislative committee
should be established for the purpose of devising a statutory code which would be
submitted to congress for enactment.
In a few states, the legislative ethics committee is empowered to either
recommend legislation or promulgate judicially enforceable regulations or both. See,
e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:1144(E)(3) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. LEGIs. LAW
§ 80(2) (a) (2) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
t After this Comment went to press the Pennsylvania House of Representa-
tives passed a new ethics bill, H. Bill 1306, General Assembly of Pennsylvania (1973
Sess.). The bill is presently under consideration by the Pennsylvania Senate State
Government Committee. For a newspaper account see Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 4,
1973, at IA, col. 1.
* Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. B.A., Lafayette College, 1969; J.D.,
Villanova University, 1972. Mr. Shellenberger is presently an assistant district
attorney in the city of Philadelphia.
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APPENDIX
Pennsylvania Legislative Code of Ethics
Act of July 10, 1968, P.L. No. 154, [1968] Laws of Pa. 316.
Section 1. Short Title. - This act shall be known and may be cited as
the "Legislative Code of Ethics."
Section 2. Legislative Findings and Declaration of Policy. - The General
Assembly finds as follows:
(1) Where government is based on the consent of the governed, every citizen
is entitled to have complete confidence in the integrity of his government.
(2) It is deemed by the General Assembly to be the duty of each member,
officer, or employe of the legislative branch to help earn and honor that trust
by his own integrity and conduct in all official actions.
(3) Although the vast majority of these public servants are dedicated and
serve with high integrity, most of them would welcome a code of ethics to
clearly guide them in areas which are not now clearly defined, and
(4) It is the desire of the General Assembly to protect the public confidence
in its Legislature, to establish a guide for all legislative members, officers and
employes in decisions of personal interest conflicts and to curb any tendencies for
exploitation of official position.
Section 3. Definitions. - Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the
following words and terms when used herein shall have the respective meanings
defined as follows:
(1) "Agency" means any department, agency, commission, board, committee,
authority or other instrumentality which is created by or under the Constitution
or laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or by executive order, except
local political subdivisions or agencies, the majority of the members of whose
governing bodies are locally elected or appointed.
(2) "Agency head" and "head of any agency" means the chief executive or
administrative officer of each of the State agencies.
(3) "Assist" means to act, or agree to act, in such a way as to help, aid,
advise, furnish information to, or otherwise provide assistance to another person
believing that such action is of help, aid, advice, or assistance to such person
and with intent to so assist such person.
(4) "Compensation" means any thing of economic value, however designated,
which is paid, loaned, granted, given, donated or transferred, or to be paid,
loaned, granted, given, donated or transferred for or in consideration of personal
services to any person, official or to the State.
(5) "Gift," as used in section 5, includes any thing of economic value with
the exception of public awards, insignificant nonpecuniary gifts, political con-
tributions for which an accounting is required by and is made pursuant to the
election laws, or compensation or gifts not connected with or related to either the
legislative processes or the donee's services as a member.
(6) "Member" shall include a Senator, Representative, officer or employe
of the General Assembly or any committee thereof; but not a person employed
on a contractual basis or without compensation for a particular project.
(7) "State action" means any action on the part of the Commonwealth or
a Commonwealth agency, including, but not limited to: (i) any decision, de-
termination, finding, ruling or order, including the judgment or verdict of a
court or a quasi-judicial board, in which the Commonwealth or any of its
agencies, boards and commissions has an interest, except in such matters, in-
volving criminal prosecutions; (ii) any grant, payment, award, license, contract,
transaction, decision, sanction or approval, or the denial thereof, or the failure
to act with respect thereto, in which the Commonwealth or any of its agencies
has an interest, except in such matters involving criminal prosecutions; (iii) any
disposition of any matter by the General Assembly or any committee thereof.
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(8) "Participate" in connection with a transaction involving the Common-
wealth means to take part in State action or a proceeding personally as a
Commonwealth official, through approval, disapproval, decision, recommendation,
the rendering of advice, investigation, or the failure to act or perform a duty.
(9) "Person" means: (i) an individual, other than a Commonwealth agency
or official; (ii) a partnership, association, corporation, firm, institution, trust,
foundation or other legal entity (other than an agency), whether or not operated
for profit; (iii) a district, county, municipality or other political subdivision of
the State, or any subdivision thereof, provided such is not an agency; (iv) a
foreign country or subdivision thereof, or (v) any other entity which is not a
Commonwealth agency or official.
(10) "Responsibility" in connection with a transaction involving the Common-
wealth means the direct administration or operating authority, whether inter-
mediate or final, and either exercisable alone or with others, and either personally
or through or with others or subordinates, to effectively approve, disapprove,
fail to act or perform a duty, or otherwise direct State action in respect of
such transaction.
(11) "Thing of economic value" means any money or other thing having
economic value except food, drink or refreshments consumed by an official
including reasonable transportation and entertainment incident thereto, while the
personal guest of some person, and includes, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing: (i) any loan, except a bona fide loan made by a duly licensed
bank or savings and loan association at the normal rate of interest, any property
interest, interest in a contract, merchandise, service and any employment or
other arrangement involving a right to compensation; (ii) any option to obtain
a thing of economic value, irrespective of the conditions to the exercise of
such option; and (iii) any promise or undertaking for the present or future
delivery or procurement of a thing of economic value.
In the case of an option, promise or undertaking, the time of receipt
of the thing of economic value shall be deemed to be, respectively, the time the
right to the option becomes fixed, regardless of the conditions to its exercise,
and the time when the promise or undertaking is made, regardless of the
conditions to its performance.
(12) "Transaction involving the Commonwealth" means any proceeding,
application, submission, request for a ruling or other determination, contract,
claim, case or other such particular matter which the official in question believes,
or has reason to believe: (i) is, or will be, the subject of State action, or (ii)
is one to which the Commonwealth is or will be a party, or (iii) is one in
which the Commonwealth has a direct interest.
Section 4. Standards of Conduct. - In addition to the other provisions of
this act, and in supplement thereto, the following are established as standards of
conduct for members. No member shall:
(1) Accept employment or engage in any business or professional activity
which will require him to disclose confidential information which he has gained
by reason of his official position or authority.
(2) Improperly disclose confidential information acquired by him in the
course of his official duties nor use such information to further his personal
interests.
(3) Use or attempt to use his official position to secure unwarranted privileges
or exemptions for himself or others.
Section 5. Prohibitions. - (a) No member shall knowingly solicit, accept,
or receive any gift or compensation other than that to which he is duly entitled from
the Commonwealth which is intended to influence the performance of his official
duties or which would influence the performance of his official duties nor shall any
member solicit, accept, or receive any such gift or compensation for advocating the
passage or defeat of any legislation or for doing any act intended to influence the
passage or defeat of legislation including, in the case of a Senator or Representative,
his vote thereon.
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(b) No member shall receive compensation or any thing of economic value
for any consultation, the subject matter of which:
(1) Is devoted substantially to the responsibilities, programs, or operations
of the General Assembly, or
(2) Draws substantially upon official data or ideas which have not become
part of the body of public information.
(c) No member shall participate as a principal in any transaction involving
the Commonwealth or any Commonwealth agency in which he, his spouse or child,
or any person of which he is an officer, director, trustee, partner or employe has a
substantial personal economic interest as distinguished from that of a general class
or general group of persons of which he may reasonably be expected to know.
(d) No member shall receive any compensation or enter into any agreement
with any person for compensation for services rendered or to be rendered, for
assisting any person in any transaction involving the Commonwealth or any of its
officials or agencies unless he shall file with the Chief Clerk of the House of
Representatives or Secretary of the Senate, as the case may be, a written statement,
giving the following information:
(1) Name and address of member.
(2) The name and address of the person employing or retaining the member
to perform such services.
(3) Whether the amount of compensation for services rendered or to be
rendered is (i) one thousand dollars ($1000), or more, or (ii) less than one
thousand dollars ($1000).
(4) A brief description of the transaction in reference to which service is
rendered or is to be rendered, and of the nature of the service.
The sworn statement shall be filed with the chief clerk or secretary
within ten days from the date such agreement, express or implied, was entered
into, or the compensation was received. Such statement of disclosure shall be
deemed confidential and privileged and shall only be made public in connection
with a public hearing for an alleged violation of this code where such would be
relevant to the charges made and for which the member is being tried.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section 5, shall not apply to:
(1) Receipt of bona fide reimbursement, to the extent permitted by law,
for actual expenses for travel and such other necessary subsistence as is com-
patible with this act and for which no Commonwealth payment or reimbursement
is made.
(2) Participation in the affairs of charitable, religious, nonprofit educational,
public service or civic organizations, or the activities of national or State
political parties not proscribed by law.
(3) Awards for meritorious public contribution given by public service orcivic organizations.
(4) Sharing in any compensation received from the Commonwealth or from
any political subdivision of the Commonwealth by a person of which such
member owns or controls any portion thereof, provided such compensation was
received by such person as a result of having made the lowest competitive bid
on a Commonwealth contract or subcontract and having had such bid accepted
by the Commonwealth or the general contractor, or by reason of an engagement
by the Commonwealth in emergency circumstances where dispensation with
bidding is permitted by law, and provided such member did not assist in the
procurement of the Commonwealth's or the subdivision's or the general contractor's
acceptance of such low bid or engagement without bidding.
(5) Campaign contributions for use in meeting campaign expenses by any
official who is or becomes a candidate for election to the same or another
public office.
(6) Receipt of compensation from the Commonwealth, directly or indirectly,
where: (i) the total interest of the member and his immediate family in the
COMMENTS
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person receiving said compensation is less than ten percent, or (ii) the member
or the person in which he has an interest is the exclusive supplier of the real
or personal property or service purchased by the Commonwealth, or (iii) the
service purchased is newspaper advertising required by law.
(7) Receipt of compensation, directly or indirectly, by a member who is an
attorney-at-law, for services in a proceeding where he represents an interest
adverse to that of the Commonwealth, where the proceeding is before any court,
where the Commonwealth has a right to judicial review in a proceeding not
initially before a court, or where the proceeding involves only the uncontested
and routine action of administrative officers or employes of the Commonwealth
in issuing or renewing a license, charter, certificate or similar document.
(f) No member shall use for private gain any information not available
to the public at large and acquired by him solely by virtue of his position.
(g) No information described in subsection (f) of this section 5 shall be
disclosed by a member to others for purposes of their use for private gain,
in circumstances where the use of such information by the member would violate
subsection (f) of this section 5.
Section 6. Penalties. - (a) Any person violating section 5 of this act shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof be sentenced to pay a fine
of not more than one thousand dollars ($1000) and costs and, in default of the payment
of such fine and costs, shall undergo imprisonment for not more than two years.
(b) All fines and penalties imposed under the provisions of this section shall
be paid into the General Fund of the Commonwealth.
Section 7. Civil Remedies. - (a) Any agency head having final authority
to approve or execute a contract between the Commonwealth and a private party may
-cancel or rescind any such contract without further liability to the Commonwealth
where he finds that a violation of this act has influenced the making of said contract;
provided, such rescission shall be limited so as not to affect adversely the interests
of innocent third parties; and provided further, that no such action shall be
initiated before the affirmative finding of the appropriate House or Senate Committee
on Ethics that a violation has occurred.
(b) The finding referred to in subsection (a) supra shall be made in
accordance with the act of June 4, 1945 (P. L. 1388), as amended, known as
the "Administrative Agency Law," and shall be subject to judicial review, provided
that the executive officer may suspend the contract pending determination of the
merits of the controversy.
(c) The Attorney General may bring a civil action against any member or
former member in the judicial district in which said person is domiciled, who
shall, to his economic advantage, have acted in violation of this act, to recover
on behalf of the Commonwealth an amount equal to such economic advantage,
with interest; provided, that no such action shall be brought before the affirmative
finding of the appropriate House or Senate Committee on Ethics that a violation
has occurred.
(d) No action under subsection (c) of this section 7 shall be commenced
after the expiration of two years following the discovery by an agency head or
an Ethics Committee of the General Assembly of the occurrence of the alleged
violation, or four years after the occurrence of the alleged violation, whichever
period is shorter.
(e) The Senator or Representative having responsibility for hiring an
employe of the General Assembly may, and if so ordered by the Ethics
Committee of his respective house, shall, dismiss, suspend or take such other
action as may be appropriate under the circumstances with respect to any
employe upon a finding by the Senator or Representative or by said committee
that such employe has violated any of the provisions of this act.
Section 8. Severability Clause. - The provisions of this act are severable
and if any provision or part thereof shall be held invalid or unconstitutional or in-
applicable to any person or circumstances, such invalidity, unconstitutionality or in-
applicability shall not affect or impair the remaining provisions of the act. 55
Shellenberger and Hardt: Legislative Conflicts of Interest - An Analysis of the Pennsylvan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
